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Joint Ministerial foreword
The internet is an integral part of everyday life for so many people. Nearly nine in ten UK adults 
and 99% of 12 to 15 year olds are online. As the internet continues to grow and transform our 
lives, often for the better, we should not ignore the very real harms which people face online 
every day.
In the wrong hands the internet can be used to spread terrorist and other illegal or harmful 
content, undermine civil discourse, and abuse or bully other people. Online harms are 
widespread and can have serious consequences. 
Two thirds of adults in the UK are concerned about content online, and close to half say they 
have seen hateful content in the past year. The tragic recent events in New Zealand show just 
how quickly horrific terrorist and extremist content can spread online.
We cannot allow these harmful behaviours and content to undermine the significant benefits 
that the digital revolution can offer. While some companies have taken steps to improve safety 
on their platforms, progress has been too slow and inconsistent overall. If we surrender our 
online spaces to those who spread hate, abuse, fear and vitriolic content, then we will all lose. 
So our challenge as a society is to help shape an internet that is open and vibrant but also 
protects its users from harm. The UK is committed to a free, open and secure internet, and 
will continue to protect freedom of expression online. We must also take decisive action to 
make people safer online. 
This White Paper therefore puts forward ambitious plans for a new system of accountability 
and oversight for tech companies, moving far beyond self-regulation. A new regulatory 
framework for online safety will make clear companies’ responsibilities to keep UK users, 
particularly children, safer online with the most robust action to counter illegal content 
and activity. 
This will be overseen by an independent regulator which will set clear safety standards, 
backed up by reporting requirements and effective enforcement powers.
Although other countries have introduced regulation to address specific types of harm, this 
is the first attempt globally to address a comprehensive spectrum of online harms in a single 
and coherent way.
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The UK’s future prosperity will depend heavily on having a vibrant technology sector. 
Innovation and safety online are not mutually exclusive; through building trust in the digital 
economy and in new technologies, this White Paper will build a firmer foundation for this 
vital sector. 
As a world-leader in emerging technologies and innovative regulation, the UK is well placed to 
seize these opportunities. We want technology itself to be part of the solution, and this White 
Paper proposes measures to boost the tech-safety sector in the UK, as well as measures to 
help users manage their safety online.
We believe the approach in this White Paper can lead towards new, global approaches for 
online safety that support our democratic values, and promote a free, open and secure 
internet; and we will work with other countries to build an international consensus behind it. 
Online safety is a shared responsibility between companies, the government and users. 
We would encourage everyone to take part in the consultation that accompanies this White 
Paper, and work with us to make Britain the safest place in the world to be online. 
Rt Hon Jeremy Wright MP  Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP 
Secretary of State for Digital,  Home Secretary 
Culture, Media and Sport  
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Executive summary
1. The government wants the UK to be the safest place in the world to go online, and 
the best place to start and grow a digital business. Given the prevalence of illegal and 
harmful content online, and the level of public concern about online harms, not just in the 
UK but worldwide, we believe that the digital economy urgently needs a new regulatory 
framework to improve our citizens’ safety online. This will rebuild public confidence and 
set clear expectations of companies, allowing our citizens to enjoy more safely the benefits 
that online services offer. 
The problem
2. Illegal and unacceptable content and activity is widespread online, and UK users are 
concerned about what they see and experience on the internet. The prevalence of the 
most serious illegal content and activity, which threatens our national security or the 
physical safety of children, is unacceptable. Online platforms can be a tool for abuse and 
bullying, and they can be used to undermine our democratic values and debate. The 
impact of harmful content and activity can be particularly damaging for children, and there 
are growing concerns about the potential impact on their mental health and wellbeing. 
3. Terrorist groups use the internet to spread propaganda designed to radicalise vulnerable 
people, and distribute material designed to aid or abet terrorist attacks. There are also 
examples of terrorists broadcasting attacks live on social media. Child sex offenders use 
the internet to view and share child sexual abuse material, groom children online, and 
even live stream the sexual abuse of children.
4. There is also a real danger that hostile actors use online disinformation to undermine our 
democratic values and principles. Social media platforms use algorithms which can lead 
to ‘echo chambers’ or ‘filter bubbles’, where a user is presented with only one type of 
content instead of seeing a range of voices and opinions. This can promote disinformation 
by ensuring that users do not see rebuttals or other sources that may disagree and can 
also mean that users perceive a story to be far more widely believed than it really is.
5. Rival criminal gangs use social media to promote gang culture and incite violence. This, 
alongside the illegal sale of weapons to young people online, is a contributing factor to 
senseless violence, such as knife crime, on British streets.
6. Other online behaviours or content, even if they may not be illegal in all circumstances, 
can also cause serious harm. The internet can be used to harass, bully or intimidate, 
especially people in vulnerable groups or in public life. Young adults or children may 
be exposed to harmful content that relates, for example, to self-harm or suicide. These 
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experiences can have serious psychological and emotional impact. There are also 
emerging challenges about designed addiction to some digital services and excessive 
screen time.
Our response
7. This White Paper sets out a programme of action to tackle content or activity that harms 
individual users, particularly children, or threatens our way of life in the UK, either by 
undermining national security, or by undermining our shared rights, responsibilities and 
opportunities to foster integration. 
8. There is currently a range of regulatory and voluntary initiatives aimed at addressing 
these problems, but these have not gone far or fast enough, or been consistent enough 
between different companies, to keep UK users safe online. 
9. Many of our international partners are also developing new regulatory approaches to 
tackle online harms, but none has yet established a regulatory framework that tackles this 
range of online harms. The UK will be the first to do this, leading international efforts by 
setting a coherent, proportionate and effective approach that reflects our commitment to 
a free, open and secure internet.
10. As a world-leader in emerging technologies and innovative regulation, the UK is well 
placed to seize these opportunities. We want technology itself to be part of the solution, 
and we propose measures to boost the tech-safety sector in the UK, as well as measures 
to help users manage their safety online.
11. The UK has established a reputation for global leadership in advancing shared efforts to 
improve online safety. Tackling harmful content and activity online is one part of the UK’s 
wider ambition to develop rules and norms for the internet, including protecting personal 
data, supporting competition in digital markets and promoting responsible digital design. 
12. Our vision is for:
 • A free, open and secure internet.
 • Freedom of expression online.
 • An online environment where companies take effective steps to keep their users 
safe, and where criminal, terrorist and hostile foreign state activity is not left to 
contaminate the online space.
 • Rules and norms for the internet that discourage harmful behaviour. 
 • The UK as a thriving digital economy, with a prosperous ecosystem of companies 
developing innovation in online safety.
 • Citizens who understand the risks of online activity, challenge unacceptable 
behaviours and know how to access help if they experience harm online, with 
children receiving extra protection.
 • A global coalition of countries all taking coordinated steps to keep their citizens 
safe online.
 • Renewed public confidence and trust in online companies and services.
Clarity for companies
13. Increasing public concern about online harms has prompted calls for further action from 
governments and tech companies. In particular, as the power and influence of large 
companies has grown, and privately-run platforms have become akin to public spaces, 
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some of these companies now acknowledge their responsibility to be guided by norms 
and rules developed by democratic societies.
14. The new regulatory framework this White Paper describes will set clear standards to help 
companies ensure safety of users while protecting freedom of expression, especially in 
the context of harmful content or activity that may not cross the criminal threshold but can 
be particularly damaging to children or other vulnerable users. It will promote a culture of 
continuous improvement among companies, and encourage them to develop and share 
new technological solutions rather than complying with minimum requirements. 
15. It will also provide clarity for the wide range of businesses of all sizes that are in scope 
of the new regulatory framework but whose services present much lower risks of harm, 
helping them to understand and fulfil their obligations in a proportionate manner. 
A new regulatory framework for online safety
16. The government will establish a new statutory duty of care to make companies take more 
responsibility for the safety of their users and tackle harm caused by content or activity on 
their services. 
17. Compliance with this duty of care will be overseen and enforced by an independent 
regulator.
18. All companies in scope of the regulatory framework will need to be able to show that 
they are fulfilling their duty of care. Relevant terms and conditions will be required to 
be sufficiently clear and accessible, including to children and other vulnerable users. 
The regulator will assess how effectively these terms are enforced as part of any 
regulatory action.
19. The regulator will have a suite of powers to take effective enforcement action against 
companies that have breached their statutory duty of care. This may include the 
powers to issue substantial fines and to impose liability on individual members of 
senior management.
20. Companies must fulfil the new legal duty. The regulator will set out how to do this in codes 
of practice. If companies want to fulfil this duty in a manner not set out in the codes, they 
will have to explain and justify to the regulator how their alternative approach will effectively 
deliver the same or greater level of impact.
21. Reflecting the threat to national security or the physical safety of children, the government 
will have the power to direct the regulator in relation to codes of practice on terrorist 
activity or child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) online, and these codes must be 
signed off by the Home Secretary. 
22. For codes of practice relating to illegal harms, including incitement of violence and the sale 
of illegal goods and services such as weapons, there will be a clear expectation that the 
regulator will work with law enforcement to ensure the codes adequately keep pace with 
the threat. 
23. Developing a culture of transparency, trust and accountability will be a critical element 
of the new regulatory framework. The regulator will have the power to require annual 
transparency reports from companies in scope, outlining the prevalence of harmful 
content on their platforms and what countermeasures they are taking to address these. 
These reports will be published online by the regulator, so that users and parents can 
make informed decisions about internet use. The regulator will also have powers to 
require additional information, including about the impact of algorithms in selecting 
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content for users and to ensure that companies proactively report on both emerging and 
known harms. 
24. The regulator will encourage and oversee the fulfilment of companies’ existing 
commitments to improve the ability of independent researchers to access their data, 
subject to appropriate safeguards. 
25. As part of the new duty of care, we will expect companies, where appropriate, to 
have effective and easy-to-access user complaints functions, which will be overseen 
by the regulator. Companies will need to respond to users’ complaints within an 
appropriate timeframe and to take action consistent with the expectations set out in the 
regulatory framework. 
26. We also recognise the importance of an independent review mechanism to ensure that 
users have confidence that their concerns are being treated fairly. We are consulting on 
options, including allowing designated bodies to make ‘super complaints’ to the regulator 
in order to defend the needs of users. 
27. Ahead of the implementation of the new regulatory framework, we will continue to 
encourage companies to take early action to address online harms. To assist this process, 
this White Paper sets out high-level expectations of companies, including some specific 
expectations in relation to certain harms. We expect the regulator to reflect these in future 
codes of practice. 
28. For the most serious online offending such as CSEA and terrorism, we will expect 
companies to go much further and demonstrate the steps taken to combat the 
dissemination of associated content and illegal behaviours. We will publish interim codes 
of practice, providing guidance about tackling terrorist activity and online CSEA later 
this year. 
The companies in scope of the regulatory framework
29. We propose that the regulatory framework should apply to companies that allow users to 
share or discover user-generated content or interact with each other online. 
30. These services are offered by a very wide range of companies of all sizes, including social 
media platforms, file hosting sites, public discussion forums, messaging services and 
search engines. 
31. The regulator will take a risk-based and proportionate approach across this broad 
range of business types. This will mean that the regulator’s initial focus will be on those 
companies that pose the biggest and clearest risk of harm to users, either because of the 
scale of the platforms or because of known issues with serious harms. 
32. Every company within scope will need to fulfil their duty of care, particularly to counter 
illegal content and activity, comply with information requests from the regulator, and, 
where appropriate, establish and maintain a complaints and appeals function which 
meets the requirements to be set out by the regulator. 
33. Reflecting the importance of privacy, any requirements to scan or monitor content for 
tightly defined categories of illegal content will not apply to private channels. We are 
consulting on definitions of private communications, and what measures should apply to 
these services.
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An independent regulator for online safety
34. An independent regulator will implement, oversee and enforce the new regulatory 
framework. It will have sufficient resources and the right expertise and capability to 
perform its role effectively. 
35. The regulator will take a risk-based approach, prioritising action to tackle activity or 
content where there is the greatest evidence or threat of harm, or where children or 
other vulnerable users are at risk. To support this, the regulator will work closely with UK 
Research and Innovation (UKRI) and other partners to improve the evidence base. The 
regulator will set out expectations for companies to do what is reasonably practicable to 
counter harmful activity or content, depending on the nature of the harm, the risk of the 
harm occurring on their services, and the resources and technology available to them.
36. The regulator will have a legal duty to pay due regard to innovation, and to protect users’ 
rights online, taking particular care not to infringe privacy or freedom of expression. We 
are clear that the regulator will not be responsible for policing truth and accuracy online. 
37. The government is consulting on whether the regulator should be a new or existing body. 
The regulator will be funded by industry in the medium term, and the government is 
exploring options such as fees, charges or a levy to put it on a sustainable footing. This 
could fund the full range of the regulator’s activity, including producing codes of practice, 
enforcing the duty of care, preparing transparency reports, and any education and 
awareness activities undertaken by the regulator.
Enforcement of the regulatory framework
38. The regulator will have a range of enforcement powers, including the power to levy 
substantial fines, that will ensure that all companies in scope of the regulatory framework 
fulfil their duty of care. 
39. We are consulting on which enforcement powers the regulator should have at its disposal, 
particularly to ensure a level playing field between companies that have a legal presence 
in the UK, and those which operate entirely from overseas. 
40. In particular, we are consulting on powers that would enable the regulator to disrupt the 
business activities of a non-compliant company, measures to impose liability on individual 
members of senior management, and measures to block non-compliant services. 
41. The new regulatory framework will increase the responsibility of online services in a way 
that is compatible with the EU’s e-Commerce Directive, which limits their liability for illegal 
content until they have knowledge of its existence, and have failed to remove it from their 
services in good time. 
Technology as part of the solution
42. Companies should invest in the development of safety technologies to reduce the burden 
on users to stay safe online. 
43. In November 2018, the Home Secretary co-hosted a hackathon with five major tech 
companies to develop a new tool to tackle online grooming, which will be licensed for free 
to other companies, but more of these innovative and collaborative efforts are needed.
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44. The government and the regulator will work with leading industry bodies and other 
regulators to support innovation and growth in this area and encourage the adoption of 
safety technologies. 
45. The government will also work with industry and civil society to develop a safety by design 
framework, linking up with existing legal obligations around data protection by design 
and secure by design principles, to make it easier for start-ups and small businesses to 
embed safety during the development or update of products and services. 
Empowering users
46. Users want to be empowered to keep themselves and their children safe online, but 
currently there is insufficient support in place and many feel vulnerable online. 
47. While companies are supporting a range of positive initiatives, there is insufficient 
transparency about the level of investment and the effectiveness of different interventions. 
The regulator will have oversight of this investment.
48. The government will develop a new online media literacy strategy. This will be developed 
in broad consultation with stakeholders, including major digital, broadcast and news 
media organisations, the education sector, researchers and civil society. This strategy 
will ensure a coordinated and strategic approach to online media literacy education and 
awareness for children, young people and adults.
Next steps
49. This is a complex and novel area for public policy. To this end, as well as setting out the 
government’s proposed approach, this White Paper poses a series of questions about the 
design of the new regulatory framework and non-legislative package. A full list of these 
questions is included at the end of this White Paper.
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PART 1: Introduction
1: The challenge
Summary
 • Illegal and unacceptable content and activity is widespread online, and UK users are 
frequently concerned about what they have seen or experienced.
 • The prevalence of the most serious illegal content and activity on the internet, which 
threatens our national security or the physical safety of children, is unacceptable. 
The ease and extremity of the most serious online offending such as child sexual 
exploitation and abuse (CSEA) continues to increase.
 • The impact of harmful content and activity can be particularly damaging for children 
and young people, and there are growing concerns about the potential impact on 
their mental health and wellbeing. 
 • Tackling illegal and harmful content and activity online is one part of the UK’s 
wider mission to develop rules and norms for the internet, including protecting 
personal data, supporting competition in digital markets and promoting responsible 
digital design.
1.1 The internet is an integral part of everyday life for so many people. Nearly nine in ten UK 
adults are online and adult users spend around one day a week on the internet.1 This is also 
true for children and young people, with 99% of 12-15 year olds going online, spending an 
average of twenty and a half hours a week on the internet.2
1.2 The internet can be a powerful force for good. It serves humanity, spreads ideas and 
enhances freedom and opportunity across the world. Online services facilitate the exchange 
of information, goods and services. They match supply and demand with great efficiency, 
increase consumer choice and lower distance between participants. 
1 Ofcom (2018). Adults’ Media Use and Attitudes Report. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_
file/0011/113222/Adults-Media-Use-and-Attitudes-Report-2018.pdf
2 Ofcom (2018). Children and parents: media use and attitudes report 2018. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/
research-and-data/media-literacy-research/childrens/children-and-parents-media-use-and-attitudes-report-2018
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1.3 However, there is growing evidence of the scale of harmful content and activity that 
people experience online. Online services can be used to spread terrorist propaganda 
and child abuse content, they can be a tool for abuse and bullying, and they can be used 
to undermine civil discourse. Despite the many benefits of the internet, more than one in 
four adult users in the UK have experienced some form of harm related either to content or 
interactions online.3
1.4 Social media platforms and other technology companies increasingly acknowledge 
that they have a greater responsibility to protect their users from harm. British citizens want 
to feel empowered to keep themselves and their children safe and secure online. Both the 
government and industry have a responsibility to ensure this is the case. 
Online harms suffered by individuals
1.5 The most appalling and horrifying illegal content and activity remains prevalent on an 
unacceptable scale. Existing efforts to tackle this activity have not delivered the necessary 
improvements, creating an urgent need for government to intervene to drive online services to 
step up their response.
1.6 There is a growing threat presented by online CSEA. In 2018 there were over 18.4 million 
referrals of child sexual abuse material by US tech companies to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).4 Of those, there were 113, 948 UK-related referrals 
in 2018, up from 82,109 in 2017. In the third quarter of 2018, Facebook reported removing 
8.7 million pieces of content globally for breaching policies on child nudity and sexual 
exploitation.5
1.7 Not only is the scale of this offending increasing, so is its severity. The internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF) estimates that 55% of the child sexual abuse material they find online 
contains children aged ten or under, and 33% of this imagery is in the most serious category 
of abuse.6 
1.8 Terrorists also continue to use online services to spread their vile propaganda and 
mobilise support (see Box 2). Terrorist content online threatens the UK’s national security and 
the safety of the public. 
1.9 All five terrorist attacks in the UK during 2017 had an online element, and online 
terrorist content remains a feature of contemporary radicalisation.7 It is seen across terrorist 
investigations, including cases where suspects have become very quickly radicalised to the 
point of planning attacks. This is partly as a result of the continued availability and deliberately 
attractive format of the terrorist material they are accessing online. 
1.10 Terrorist groups work to find new ways to spread their propaganda and evade 
government and law enforcement efforts to prevent this. These threats are not only restricted 
to the largest, best-known services, but are prevalent across the internet. Terrorist groups and 
their supporters constantly diversify their reliance on the online services they use to host their 
3 Ofcom and ICO (2018). Internet users’ experience of harm online 2018. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/
research-and-data/internet-and-on-demand-research/internet-use-and-attitudes/internet-users-experience-of-harm-
online
4 NCMEC. Available at: http://www.missingkids.com/footer/media/vnr/vnr2
5 Facebook (2018). Transparency Report. Available at: https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-
enforcement#child-nudity-and-sexual-exploitation 
6 Internet Watch Foundation (2017). Annual Report 2017. Available at: https://annualreport.iwf.org.uk/ 
7 Speech at Digital Forum, San Francisco by the Rt Hon Amber Rudd, 13 February 2018.
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material online. While Facebook reported removing over 14 million pieces of content related to 
terrorism or violent extremism in 2018,8 the terrorist group Daesh used over 100 platforms in 
2018, making use of a wider range of more permissive and smaller platforms.
1.11 We have also seen terrorists and their supporters adopting new techniques, with 
material being shared using hacked social media accounts, and propaganda videos being 
edited in an effort to avoid detection.
1.12 Terrorist groups place a huge premium on quickly reaching their audiences. A third of 
all links to Daesh propaganda, for example, are disseminated within an hour of upload, while 
in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack in Christchurch, there was a co-ordinated 
cross-platform effort to generate maximum reach of footage of the attack. It is therefore vital 
to ensure that there is the technology in place to automatically detect and remove terrorist 
content within an hour of upload, secure the prevention of re-upload and prevent, where 
possible, new content being made available to users at all.
1.13 The threat continues to evolve with terrorists’ relentless desire to seek out new ways to 
share their propaganda in an effort to radicalise and recruit. The most effective way to combat 
this adaptive threat is to have a consistent cross-platform response to ensure there are no 
safe spaces for terrorists to operate online.
1.14 Rival gangs use social media to glamourise weapons and gang life, as well as to directly 
depict or incite acts of violence. Alongside the illegal sale of weapons to young people online, 
this is a contributing factor to incidents of serious violence, including knife crime, in the UK. 
The latest police recorded crime figures, for the year ending September 2018, show an 8% 
increase in knife crime (to 39,818 offences) compared with the previous year. Homicide figures 
have risen by 14% (excluding terrorist attacks) over the same period.9
Harm: Child sexual exploitation and abuse online Box 1 
Threat:
Child sex offenders use the internet to view and share Child Sexual Abuse Material 
(CSAM), groom children online, and live stream the sexual abuse of children. The sheer 
scale of CSEA online is horrifying. 
 • In 2017, the IWF assessed 80,319 confirmed reports of websites hosting or linking to 
images of child sexual abuse. A total of 43% of the children in the images were aged 
11-15 years old, and 57% were ten years old or younger. Two per cent were aged two 
or younger.10
 • Sexual exploitation can happen to any young person – whatever their background, 
age, gender, race or sexuality or wherever they live.
 • In the most horrific cases, child sex offenders in developing countries are abusing 
children at the instigation of offenders in the UK who commission the abuse online 
and watch it over live stream for a fee.
8 Facebook (2018). Transparency Report. Available at: https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-
enforcement#child-nudity-and-sexual-exploitation
9 ONS (2019). Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending September 2018. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingseptember2018
10 Internet Watch Foundation (2017). Annual Report 2017. Available at: https://annualreport.iwf.org.uk/ 
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Impact:
 • Victims of abuse report ongoing trauma caused by the knowledge that images of 
their abuse are still being circulated and viewed by child sex offenders online. Victims 
also fear being recognised as a result of their images being available online.
 • Victims of online grooming suffer lasting harm after being blackmailed and coerced 
into sharing indecent images of themselves or live-streaming themselves to offenders, 
and live in fear that those images could be used against them.
Harm: Terrorist content online Box 2
Threat:
Terrorists, including Islamist groups such as Daesh and Al-Qaeda as well as far right 
terrorists, use the internet to spread propaganda designed to radicalise vulnerable 
people, and distribute material designed to aid and abet terrorist attacks. There are also 
examples of terrorists broadcasting attacks live on social media. Terrorist use of the 
internet poses a threat to national security and the safety of the public.
 • As larger platforms take more action against terrorist propaganda, terrorist groups 
have spread out to a wider range of more permissive and smaller platforms.
 • Terrorist groups are adopting new techniques to avoid detection, including sharing 
material via hacked social media accounts, and subtly altering propaganda videos.
 • Terrorist groups place a huge premium on quickly reaching their audiences. 
Impact:
 • The availability and spread of terrorist content online has been shown to contribute to 
terrorist attacks on UK soil.
 • All five of the terrorist attacks undertaken in the UK during 2017 had an online 
element to them.11
 • Online terrorist content is seen across terrorist investigations, including cases where 
suspects have become very quickly radicalised to the point of planning attacks.
11 Speech at Digital Forum (2018). San Francisco by the Rt Hon Amber Rudd, 13 February 2018
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Harm: Content illegally uploaded from prisons Box 3
Threat:
There are an increasing number of cases where online content originating from prisons is 
illegally uploaded by prisoners to social media.
 • Some prisoners transmit videos, images and messages from prisons using prohibited 
devices such as mobile phones.
 • They can use social media accounts to harass and intimidate their victims.
Impact:
 • This can lead to victims of crime feeling that they have no escape from their 
tormentors, even when they have been imprisoned.
 • Prisoners openly uploading content from prisons can also undermine public 
confidence in the prison service.
Tackling serious violence online Box 4 
Rival gangs use social media to promote gang culture, taunt each other and incite 
violence. Content can also either directly depict or incite real world violence or glamourise 
gang life and the use of weapons. Government and law enforcement are taking action to 
tackle this threat:
 • We have provided £1.4 million to support a new national police capability to tackle 
gang related activity on social media. 
 • This will bring together a dedicated team to take action against online material, 
focusing on investigative, disruption and enforcement work against specific gang 
targets, as well as making referrals to social media companies so illegal and harmful 
content can be taken down.
 • Prior to this, a new action group was established to bring together government, social 
media companies, police and community groups to tackle violent material available 
via social media.
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Harm: The sale of opioids online Box 5
Threat:
Powerful and dangerous opioids are marketed and sold online. Fentanyl and its 
analogues (substances with similar but slightly altered chemical structures) are a group of 
powerful synthetic opioids. They have similar effects to other opioids such as morphine 
and heroin, but are significantly more potent. 
 • Since December 2016, there have been at least 143 recorded deaths in the UK 
attributed to Fentanyl and its analogues.12 Fentanyl has been sold on several well-
known social media sites. The products are marketed as top-quality substances with 
fast and secure delivery, with mobile phone numbers provided for follow-up contact.13 
 • Of particular concern is that some social media groups and threads, including those 
used by vulnerable people, are being targeted. This includes people suffering from 
chronic pain, where there is a risk of accidental overdose and people dealing with 
depression, where there is a risk that the fentanyl may be used to assist suicide. 
Impact:
 • Whilst these products continue to be made available there is a risk that fatalities will 
increase.
 • There is also a risk that health professionals and other first responders will continue to 
be exposed to potentially harmful environments.
1.15 Beyond illegal activity, other behaviour online also causes harm. In 2017, one in five 
children aged 11 to 19 reported having experienced cyberbullying in the past year14; 21% of 
women have received misogynistic abuse online,15 and half of girls aware of sexist abuse on 
social media say this has restricted what they do or aspire to in some way.16 The House of 
Commons Petitions Committee has highlighted the extreme abuse experienced online by 
disabled people, which has forced some of them to leave social media.17 
1.16 Victims have also described a qualitative difference between online and offline harms, 
particularly in reference to online abuse. The Law Commission noted the perceived anonymity 
of offenders as one of the characteristics of online abuse that may result in a different 
experience for victims – see Box 6.18 Many users also feel that the market currently offers 
12 NCA analysis.
13 Ibid.
14 NHS Digital (2018). Mental Health of Children and Young People in England, 2017. Available at: https://files.digital.nhs.
uk/C9/999365/MHCYP%202017%20Behaviours%20Lifestyles%20Identities.pdf 
15 Amnesty International (2017). The impact of online abuse against women. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/
latest/news/2017/11/amnesty-reveals-alarming-impact-of-online-abuse-against-women/ 
16 Girl Guiding (2016). Girls Attitudes Survey 2016. Available at: https://www.girlguiding.org.uk/globalassets/docs-and-
resources/research-and-campaigns/girls-attitudes-survey-2016.pdf
17 House of Commons Petitions Committee (2019). Online abuse and the experience of disabled people. The Petitions 
Committee, 2019. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpetitions/759/759.pdf
18 Law Commission (2018). Abusive and Offensive Communications. Available at: https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/abusive-
and-offensive-online-communications/
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them very few alternative, safer online services. For example, the 2018 Doteveryone Digital 
Attitudes19 report found that almost half of respondents felt they had no choice but to sign up 
to online services, even where they had concerns. 
Tackling online anonymous abuse Box 6
The internet can be used to harass, bully or intimidate. In many cases of harassment 
and other forms of abusive communications online, the offender will be unknown to the 
victim. In some instances, they will have taken technical steps to conceal their identity. 
Government and law enforcement are taking action to tackle this threat.
 • The police have a range of legal powers to identify individuals who attempt to use 
anonymity to escape sanctions for online abuse, where the activity is illegal. The 
government will work with law enforcement to review whether the current powers are 
sufficient to tackle anonymous abuse online.
 • We are enhancing law enforcement’s ability to tackle anonymous online abuse by 
investing in training that is designed to improve digital capability across policing. 
For example, as part of the £4.6 million Police Transformation Fund allocated by the 
Home Office, the Digital Investigation and Intelligence programme will build police 
capability to respond to the full range of digital crime types, through investment in 
technology and training.
 • We are also making it easier for the public to report online crimes. Through the Digital 
Public Contact programme, we will provide the public with a digitally accessible police 
force with a consistent set of online capabilities to use in engaging and transacting 
with police services through a single online channel.
 • We also expect companies to do substantially more to keep their users safe and 
counter online abuse, particularly where this is illegal. Companies need to take 
responsibility for tackling abusive behaviour on their services. More detail is set out in 
Chapter 3.
Online harms suffered by children and young people 
1.17 Being online can be a hugely positive experience for children and young people – see 
Box 7. Recent research by internet Matters found that seven in ten parents think screen time 
is essential for their children’s learning development and two thirds of parents feel that devices 
give their children another outlet for creativity, particularly so for children aged 6-10.20 
1.18 However, the impact of harmful content and activity can be particularly damaging for 
children, as set out in Box 1 above and Boxes 8-10 below. There is also growing concern 
about the relationship between social media and the mental health of children and young 
people. The Children’s Commissioner’s report published in November 2018 Who knows what 
about me sets out the huge size and growth of children’s digital footprint and the associated 
19 Doteveryone (2018). People, Power and Technology: The 2018 Digital Attitudes Report. Available at: https://attitudes.
doteveryone.org.uk/files/People%20Power%20and%20Technology%20Doteveryone%20Digital%20Attitudes%20
Report%202018.pdf 
20 Internet Matters (2018). Look Both Ways: Practical Parenting in the Age of Screens. Available at: https://www.
Internetmatters.org/about-us/screen-time-report-2018/
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risks and benefits.21 Internet Matters reported in February 2019 that vulnerable young 
people are more likely to suffer online harms and less likely to receive online safety advice 
and education.22 
The positive impact of being online for children and young people Box 7
Most children have a positive experience online, using the internet for social networking 
and connecting with peers, as well as to access educational resources, information, 
and entertainment. The internet opens up new opportunities for learning, performance, 
creativity and expression.
 • A literature review by the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (2017) highlights 
evidence that young people recognise the positive role of the internet in relation to 
self-expression, developing understanding, bringing people together and respecting 
and celebrating differences. 23 Research by UNICEF (2017) shows that use of 
technology is beneficial for children’s social relationships, enabling them to enhance 
existing relationships and build positive friendships online.24
 • A report by The Royal Society for Public Health in 2017 found that young people 
reading blogs or watching vlogs on personal health issues helped improve their 
knowledge and understanding, prompted individuals to access health services, and 
enabled them to better explain their own health issues or make better choices.25 They 
also found that young people are increasingly turning to social media as a means of 
emotional support to prevent and address mental health issues. 
 • More recently, research by Ofcom showed that nine in ten social media users aged 
12-15 state that this use has made them feel happy or helped them feel closer to 
their friends. Two thirds of 12-15 year olds who use social media or messaging sites 
say they send support messages, comments or posts to friends if they are having a 
difficult time. One in eight support causes or organisations by sharing or commenting 
on posts.26 
 • In the 2019 UK Safer Internet Centre survey,27 70% of young people surveyed said 
that being online helps them understand what’s happening in the world, with 60% 
noting they have only seen or heard about certain issues or news because they 
heard about them from the internet. 43% said they have been inspired to take action 
because of something they saw online, with 48% stating being online makes them 
feel that their voice or actions matter.
21 Children’s Commissioner (2018). Who knows what about me? Available at: https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/who-knows-what-about-me.pdf
22 Internet Matters (2019). Vulnerable Children in a Digital World. Available at: https://pwxp5srs168nsac2n3fnjyaa-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Vulnerable-Children-in-a-Digital-World-FINAL.pdf 
23 UKCCIS Evidence Group (2017). Children’s online activities, risks and safety. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/childrens-online-activities-risks-and-safety-a-literature-review-by-the-ukccis-evidence-group
24 UNICEF (2017). How does the time children spend using digital technology impact their mental well-being, social 
relationships and physical activity? Available at: https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/Children-digital-
technology-wellbeing.pdf 
25 RSPH (2017). Status of mind: Social media and young people’s mental health and wellbeing. Available at: https://www.
rsph.org.uk/uploads/assets/uploaded/62be270a-a55f-4719-ad668c2ec7a74c2a.pdf
26 Ofcom (2018). Children and parents: media use and attitudes report 2018. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/
research-and-data/media-literacy-research/childrens/children-and-parents-media-use-and-attitudes-report-2018
27 UK Safer Internet Centre (2019). Our internet, Our Choice Report. Available at: https://www.saferInternet.org.uk/safer-
Internet-day/safer-Internet-day-2019/our-Internet-our-choice-report
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Harm: Cyberbullying Box 8
Threat: 
In 2017, one in five children surveyed aged 11-19 reported having experienced 
cyberbullying in the past year.28
 • The prevalence of cyberbullying is higher for some groups, such as women, religious 
minorities, LGBT+, BME and disabled individuals.29
Impact:
 • Cyberbullying has been shown to have psychological and emotional impact. In a 
large survey of young people who had been cyberbullied, 41% had developed social 
anxiety, 37% had developed depression, 26% had suicidal thoughts and 25% had 
self-harmed.30
 • These figures are all higher than corresponding statistics for ‘offline’ bullying, and 
indicated the increased potential for harm of cyberbullying.
Harm: Self-harm and suicide Box 9
Threat:
In a survey of young adults, 22.5% reported self-harm and suicide-related internet use, 
including 8.2% and 7.5% who had actively searched for information about self-harm and 
suicide respectively.31
 • Amongst those who had harmed with suicidal intent, 70% reported self-harm and 
suicide-related internet use.32
 • The prevalence of using the internet to view related content has also been found to 
be higher in children than adults. One study of those presenting to hospital following 
self-harm found that 26% of children had viewed self-harm and suicide content, 
compared to 8.4% of adults.33
28 NHS Digital (2018). Mental Health of Children and Young People in England, 2017. Available at: https://files.digital.nhs.
uk/C9/999365/MHCYP%202017%20Behaviours%20Lifestyles%20Identities.pdf
29 Ditch the Label (2017). ‘The Annual Bullying Survey 2017’. Available at: https://www.ditchthelabel.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/07/The-Annual-Bullying-Survey-2017-2.pdf 
30 Ibid. 
31 Mars, B et al. (2015). Exposure to, and searching for, information about suicide and self-harm on the internet: 
Prevalence and predictors in a population based cohort of young adults’ Journal of affective disorders,185, 239-45. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2015.06.001
32 Ibid.
33 Padmanathan, P. et al. (2018). Suicide and Self-Harm Related internet Use. Crisis. Available at: https://doi.
org/10.1027/0227-5910/a000522
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Impact:
 • The National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Safety in Mental Health (NCISH) 
analysed the characteristics of 595 children and young people (aged under 20) who 
had died by suicide in the UK between 2014 and 2016. 
 • The NCISH found that suicide-related internet use (i.e. searching the internet for 
information on suicide methods) was reported for almost a quarter (23%) of these 
children and young people.34
Harm: Underage sharing of sexual imagery Box 10
Many children and young people take and share sexual images. Creating, possessing, 
copying or distributing sexual or indecent images of children and young people under the 
age of 18 is illegal, including those taken and shared by the subject of the image.
 • Surveys provide tentative evidence that between 26%35 and 38%36 of 14-17 year olds 
have sent sexual images to a partner, and between 12% and 49% have received a 
sexual image.37
 • The proportion of young people sending images varies with age, with one study 
indicating that 26% of 14 year olds had sent and received sexual images, rising to 
48% of 16 year olds.38
Impact: 
 • Sharing sexual images can expose children and young people to bullying, humiliation, 
objectification and guilt. These images can be shared widely and appear on offender 
forums or adult pornography sites, or be used to extort further imagery. This puts 
children and young people in a vulnerable position and at risk of harm. It is a criminal 
offence to produce, possess or share sexual images of under 18 year olds. 
 • The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) reported that 
sexting was discussed in 1,392 counselling sessions with children and young people 
on their helplines that year, representing a 15% increase on the year before.39
1.19 The UK Chief Medical Officers (UK CMOs) commissioned independent researchers 
to carry out a systematic evidence review on the impact of social media use on children and 
young people’s mental health. The review covered important and diverse issues including 
cyberbullying, online gaming, sleep problems and problematic internet use, which is also 
known as ‘internet addiction’. 
34 National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Safety in Mental Health (2018). Annual Report: England, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, Wales. University of Manchester. Available at: http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/display.
aspx?DocID=38469 
35 Brook (2017). Digital Romance. Available at: https://www.brook.org.uk/press-releases/digital-romance
36 UKCCIS Evidence Group (2017). Children’s online activities, risks and safety. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/childrens-online-activities-risks-and-safety-a-literature-review-by-the-ukccis-evidence-group
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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1.20 Overall the research did not present evidence of a causal relationship between 
screen-based activities and mental health problems, but it did find some associations 
between screen-based activities and negative effects, such as increased risk of anxiety or 
depression.40 It is important that parents and carers support their children to have positive 
experiences online. 
1.21 While there is not yet sufficient evidence about the impact of screen time to support 
detailed guidelines for parents or requirements on companies, we will continue to support 
research in this area and ensure high quality advice is available to families. We also welcome 
efforts from the industry to develop tools to help individuals and families understand and 
manage how much time they spend online – more information on these is in Box 33.
Emerging challenge: Screen time Box 11
Screen time and its impact on children is an issue of growing concern. Research 
by Internet Matters found that nearly half of parents (47%) are concerned about the 
amount of time their child spends online and 88% take measures to limit their child’s use 
of devices.41
 • The UK CMOs recently conducted a systematic evidence review on children and 
young people’s screen and social media use. The CMO subsequently produced 
advice for parents and carers to encourage them to discuss boundaries with children 
around online behaviours and time spent using screens, and to lead by example. 
 • For example, the UK CMOs advised that: 
 – Sleep matters. Getting enough good quality sleep is very important. Leave phones 
outside the bedroom when it is bedtime.
 – Sharing sensibly. Talk about sharing photos and information online and how 
photos and words are sometimes manipulated. Parents and carers should never 
assume that children are happy for their photos to be shared. For everyone – 
when in doubt, don’t upload!
 – Education matters. Make sure you and your children are aware of, and abide by, 
their school’s policy on screen time.
 – Keep moving! Everyone should take a break after a couple of hours sitting or lying 
down using a screen. It’s good to get up and move about a bit. #sitlessmovemore
 – Safety when out and about. Advise children to put their screens away while 
crossing the road or doing an activity that needs their full attention.
 – Talking helps. Talk with children about using screens and what they are watching. 
A change in behaviour can be a sign they are distressed – make sure they 
know they can always speak to you or another responsible adult if they feel 
uncomfortable with screen or social media use.
40 Department of Health and Social Care (2019). United Kingdom Chief Medical Officers’ commentary on Screen-based 
activities and children and young people’s mental health and psychosocial wellbeing: a systematic map of reviews. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-cmo-commentary-on-screen-time-and-social-media-
map-of-reviews
41 Internet Matters (2018). Look Both Ways: Practical Parenting in the Age of Screens. Available at: https://www.
Internetmatters.org/about-us/screen-time-report-2018/
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 – Family time together. Screen-free meal times are a good idea – you can enjoy 
face-to-face conversation, with adults giving their full attention to children.
 – Use helpful phone features. Some devices and platforms have special features – 
try using these features to keep track of how much time you (and with their 
permission, your children) spend looking at screens or on social media.
Future action – building our understanding:
Given the amount of time many children spend online, and the level of parental concern 
on this issue, we urgently need to build a better understanding.
 • While we do not expect the regulator to set requirements around screen time, both 
government and the regulator will continue to support research in this area to inform 
future action in this space.
 • We need to develop a better understanding of not just of the impact of screen time as 
a whole, but also between different types of screen time and children’s development 
and wellbeing.
 • As part of this, we also expect companies to support the developing evidence 
base around screen time, for example by providing access to anonymised data to 
researchers as recommended by the CMOs 
 • If the emerging evidence base demonstrates a strong link between different elements 
of screen time and damage to children’s wellbeing or development, companies will be 
expected to take appropriate action to fulfil their duty of care.
Threats to our way of life 
1.22 The UK’s reputation and influence across the globe is founded upon our values and 
principles. Our society is built on confidence in public institutions, trust in electoral processes, 
a robust, lively and plural media, and hard-won democratic freedoms that allow different 
voices, views and opinions to freely and peacefully contribute to public discourse. 
1.23 Inaccurate information, regardless of intent, can be harmful – for example the spread of 
inaccurate anti-vaccination messaging online poses a risk to public health. The government 
is particularly worried about disinformation (information which is created or disseminated 
with the deliberate intent to mislead; this could be to cause harm, or for personal, political or 
financial gain).
1.24 Disinformation threatens these values and principles, and can threaten public safety, 
undermine national security, fracture community cohesion and reduce trust. 
1.25 These concerns have been well set out in the wide-ranging inquiry led by the Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Select Committee report on fake news and disinformation, 
published on 18 February 2019. This White Paper has benefited greatly from this analysis and 
takes forward a number of the recommendations. The government will be responding to the 
DCMS Select Committee report in full in due course. We also note the recent papers from the 
Electoral Commission and Information Commissioner’s Office on this and wider issues, and 
are considering these closely.
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Harm: Online disinformation Box 12
Threat:
Online disinformation – spreading false information to deceive deliberately – is becoming 
more and more prevalent. Misinformation refers to the inadvertent sharing of false 
information.
 • A recent study from the University of Oxford’s Computational Propaganda Project has 
found evidence of organised social media manipulation campaigns in 48 countries in 
2018.42 According to the Reuters Institute, 61% of people want the government to do 
more to separate what is real and fake on the internet (2018).43
 • One of the major technological challenges in disinformation is the continued 
development of AI systems. AI techniques can be used to target and manipulate 
individual voters, with highly sophisticated micro-targeting based on individual 
psychology.
 • AI can be beneficial in the automatic detection of content, or automatically fact-
checking articles. But developments in AI also make it possible to generate fake 
content (text, audio and video) which is difficult to detect by humans and algorithms 
– known as ‘deepfakes’. As a result, it is becoming even easier to create and 
disseminate false content and narratives. 
 • The Russian State is a major source of disinformation. The Kremlin has used 
disinformation to obfuscate and confuse audiences around their illegal annexation of 
Crimea, intervention in eastern Ukraine and the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines 
flight MH17, which led to the deaths of 298 people including ten UK citizens. After the 
attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury in March 2018, the Russian 
State led a concerted disinformation campaign to distract from their culpability. 
This included the use of state media and covert social media accounts to sow over 
40 different narratives as to what happened.
Impact:
 • Most users are not always aware that much of the content they see is determined by 
sophisticated algorithms that draw on data about their online activity, such as their 
browsing history, their social media networks and what they post. 
 • Research by Doteveryone suggests that 62% of people do not realise that their social 
networks can affect the news they see,44 while only three in ten adult online users 
questioned by Ofcom were aware of the ways in which companies can collect data 
about them online.45
42 Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation.Available at: https://comprop.
oii.ox.ac.uk/research/cybertroops2018/ 
43 Newman, N. et al. (2018). Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018. Available at: http://media.digitalnewsreport.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/06/digital-news-report-2018.pdf?x89475
44 Miller, C., Coldicutt, R., and Kitcher, H. (2018). People, Power and Technology: The 
2018 Digital Understanding Report Doteveryone. Available at: http://understanding.doteveryone.org.uk/files/
Doteveryone_PeoplePowerTechDigitalUnderstanding2018.pdf
45 Ofcom (2018). Adults’ Media Use and Attitudes Report. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_
file/0011/113222/Adults-Media-Use-and-Attitudes-Report-2018.pdf
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Harm: Online manipulation Box 13
Threat:
Propaganda and false information have long been used to persuade and mislead, but the 
internet, social media and AI provide ever more effective ways to manipulate opinion. 
 • The tolerance of conflicting views and ideas are core facets of our democracy. 
However, these are inherently vulnerable to the efforts of a few to manipulate and 
confuse the information environment for nefarious purposes, including undermining 
trust. A combination of personal data collection, AI based algorithms and false or 
misleading information could be used to manipulate the public with unprecedented 
effectiveness. 
 • The distinction between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation is not 
new. The government took action to prevent subliminal broadcast advertising in 
the Broadcasting Act 1990. The government gave the Independent Television 
Commission (replaced by Ofcom) a duty to ensure that licensed services complied 
with requirements not to include technical devices which convey messages or 
influence individuals without them being aware. We believe the government should 
make sure there are similar boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate practices 
online. The techniques and practices used are still emerging. We are developing a 
better understanding of the nature and scale of the potential problem and effective 
interventions. 
Harm: Online abuse of public figures Box 14
Threat:
In recent years we have seen a worrying rise in the amount of abuse, harassment and 
intimidation directed at those in public life. Much of this abuse happens on social media.
Impact:
 • An international survey of female journalists found two thirds (64%) had experienced 
online abuse – death or rape threats, sexist comments, cyberstalking, account 
impersonation, and obscene messages.46 Almost half (47%) did not report the abuse 
they had received, and two fifths (38%) admitted to self-censorship in the face of 
this abuse.47
 • The Guardian’s research into the 70 million comments left on its site over a ten year 
period highlighted that of the ten most abused writers, eight were women and two 
were black men. This is in spite of the fact that the majority of the regular opinion 
writers for The Guardian are white men. This was then compared to the ten writers 
who received the least abuse – who were all men.48
46 IFJ (2018). IFJ global survey shows massive impact of online abuse on women journalists. Available at:  
https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/article/ifj-global-survey-shows-massive-impact-of-online-abuse-on-
women-journalists.html
 Note no similar data is available for male journalists.
47 Ibid.
48 The Guardian (2016). The dark side of Guardian comments. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/apr/12/the-dark-side-of-guardian-comments
PART 1: Introduction  25
There are too many stories of public figures closing their social media accounts following 
waves of abuse. 
 • In December 2017 the Committee for Standards in Public Life, which was 
commissioned by the Prime Minister, published its report on intimidation in public 
life.49 The consultation sought views on a range of ideas including establishing a new 
offence of intimidation, and requiring imprints on electronic campaigning. The report 
included examples of the extent of intimidation of those in public life.
 • “It is hard to explain how it makes you feel. It is anonymous people that you’ve never 
met, true, but it has a genuinely detrimental effect on your mental health. You are 
constantly thinking about these people and the hatred and bile they are directing 
towards you.” – Rachel Maclean MP
 • “I spoke on a number of occasions in the House of Commons in different committees 
about the rights of women. To which I suffered daily attacks on Twitter, on my 
email system or endless online articles written about how people wished to see me 
raped.” – Jess Phillips MP
 • The report also makes a number of recommendations for actions that social media 
companies should take in relation to intimidatory content, including implementing 
tools to enhance the ability of users to tackle online intimidation and supporting 
users who become victims of this behaviour.50 These recommendations have helped 
to shape the indicative list of steps the regulator may want to include in codes of 
practice.
 • The government’s response to the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s Review 
of Intimidation in Public Life was published in March 2018 and set out a number of 
actions for government based on the Committee’s recommendations. As part of this 
work the government has undertaken a public consultation entitled Protecting the 
Debate: Intimidation, Influence and Information which closed in October 2018. The 
government’s response will be published in due course.
This abuse is unacceptable – it goes beyond free speech and free debate, dissuades 
good people from going into public life, and corrodes the values on which our 
democracy rests.
The new regulatory framework will make clear companies’ responsibility to address 
this harm.
Other online harms
1.26 There are other harms associated with the internet and online technology. For example, 
Ofcom and ICO’s report on Internet Regulation highlighted users’ concerns around privacy 
and hacking.51 This White Paper is part of the government’s wider programme of work to 
establish the right norms and rules for the internet.
49 Committee on Standards in Public Life (2017). Intimidation in Public Life. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/666927/6.3637_CO_v6_061217_Web3.1__2_.pdf
50 Government action to date is available here: https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-
answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2019-03-07/HCWS1389/
51 Ofcom and ICO (2018). Internet users’ experience of harm online. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-
and-data/Internet-and-on-demand-research/Internet-use-and-attitudes/Internet-users-experience-of-harm-online
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Responsible and ethical technology
1.27 The government takes both the protection of personal data and the right to privacy 
extremely seriously. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection 
Act 2018 (DPA), alongside the increased powers for the ICO to gather evidence, inspect 
artificial intelligence (AI) and levy significant fines on those who break the law, update our data 
protection laws fit for the digital age. 
1.28 The DPA also includes an important new provision requiring the Information 
Commissioner to produce an age-appropriate design code. This provision breaks new ground 
by addressing the approach to the design of online services likely to be used by children. It 
ensures platforms and service providers put child user interests at the centre of the design 
process, and protects them from risks that arise from the use of their personal data online, 
including the algorithms and profiling that serves them with personalised content. 
1.29 However, the increased use of data and AI is giving rise to complex, fast-moving 
and far-reaching ethical and economic issues that cannot be addressed by data protection 
laws alone. Increasingly sophisticated algorithms can glean powerful insights, which can be 
deployed in ways that influence the decisions we make and the services we receive. It is 
essential that we understand, and respond to, barriers to the ethical deployment of AI. 
1.30 That is why the government has set up the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation. The 
Centre will provide independent, impartial and expert advice on the ethical and innovative 
deployment of data and AI. The Centre will publish its first strategy document in spring 2019, 
setting out further details on its key priorities.
1.31 The way that technology is designed, who it is designed by and the outcomes it 
is trying to achieve also influence how it impacts its users and wider society. There is an 
increasing amount of evidence that social media platforms and other digital services can 
impact people’s habits, sleep patterns, productivity at work, attention spans and even 
voting preferences – see Box 15. We are looking carefully at how we can ensure that digital 
products and services are designed in a responsible way, with their users’ well-being in mind. 
Chapter 8 of this paper looks specifically at how we are working with companies to include 
considerations around safety in the design of their products.
Emerging challenge: Designed addiction Box 15
Some online products have been designed to encourage continuous use. They include 
seemingly small but influential features, which incentivise people to keep using the app 
or platform for longer. One common example is the ‘infinite scroll’, in which information 
is loaded continuously as the user scrolls down the page, encouraging the user to keep 
scrolling. 
 • A recent report by 5Rights highlighted other elements of ‘persuasive design’, such as 
‘typing bubbles’, quantifying friends, and notifications. Even ‘likes’ can be powerful 
tools for keeping users online.52
52 5Rights (2018). Disrupted Childhood: The Cost of Persuasive Design, 5Rights. Available at: https://5rightsfoundation.
com/static/5Rights-Disrupted-Childhood.pdf
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 • These techniques could exacerbate addictive behaviours. The number of people 
suffering from clinical addiction in this way has not been reliably quantified, but there 
are well-documented extreme cases of vulnerable individuals for whom addiction 
has got in the way of social lives, sleep, physical activity and other parts of a healthy, 
balanced lifestyle.
 • There is also evidence that a wider range of people experience less extreme forms 
of compulsive or habitual behaviour online. Some experts would stress that this 
compulsive behaviour is not clinical addiction. 
Future action:
 • The government shares concerns around designed addiction and is determined to 
ensure that we have sufficient evidence on this risk, and the right expectations of 
companies to design their products in safe ways.
 • In the future, we expect the regulator will continue to support research in this area to 
inform future action and, if necessary, set clear expectations for companies to prevent 
harm to their users. 
 • We also expect companies to be transparent about design practices which 
encourage extended engagement, and to engage with researchers to understand the 
impact of these practices on their users 
 • DCMS is continuing to work with the Gambling Commission and the industry on 
player protections in the online sector. In May 2018, we published the response 
to the Consultation on Proposals for Changes to Gaming Machines and Social 
Responsibility Measures, which set out a clear plan to strengthen player protections.
 • Since then, a number of changes have been made to make gambling fairer and 
safer, including tightening advertising rules and launching GAMSTOP, the online 
self-exclusion scheme. Additionally, from May, the Gambling Commission will bring 
in changes that mean that age and identity must be verified before consumers can 
deposit money and gamble, and will require age verification before customers can 
access free-to-play demo games.
Thriving digital markets
1.32 The digital sector makes a huge contribution to our economy at £130.5 billion gross 
value added in 2017, equivalent to 7% of the UK gross value added. The sector has seen 
strong growth with an increase of 33% since 2010, compared to 29% for the total UK 
economy.53 As the digital economy has grown, powerful new companies have emerged, often 
with very dominant market positions. This has raised questions about the competitiveness of 
digital markets and what this means for consumers.
1.33 The government’s Modernising Consumer Markets Green Paper sought views 
on how well equipped the UK’s competition regime is to manage emerging challenges, 
including the growth of fast-moving digital markets. We continue to consider policy options 
across the range of measures proposed in the green paper and are conducting a review of 
53 DCMS (2019). Sectors Estimates 2017 (provisional): Gross Value Added. Available at: https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759707/DCMS_Sectors_Economic_
Estimates_2017__provisional__GVA.pdf
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digital markets, due in summer 2019. This will be informed by the work of the independent 
Digital Competition Expert Panel, led by Professor Jason Furman which published its 
recommendations for government on 13 March 2019. 
1.34 Professor Furman and the panel found that the digital economy has brought significant 
benefits but does not have enough competition. They called for a new digital markets unit to 
set and enforce a code of conduct so the largest digital companies know what are acceptable 
rules for competition. This new unit would give people more control over their data by 
enabling people to switch between platforms more easily. They also recommended changes 
to merger rules, and updating existing rules to improve enforcement over anticompetitive 
conduct. The government will consider these proposals and respond later in the year.
1.35 Thriving digital markets also rely on the innovative, efficient and fair use of data. In June 
2018, the Secretary of State for DCMS announced that we would develop a National Data 
Strategy to ensure the UK is a world-leading data economy – unlocking the power of data 
across government and the wider economy, while building public trust and confidence in 
its use.
Online advertising
1.36 Online advertising plays a crucial role in the digital economy, with many free digital 
services, such as search engines or social networks, funded by advertising revenues. The 
online advertising ecosystem is highly complex, with much of the advertising space online 
bought through automated processes, and the velocity with which adverts are created and 
displayed is far higher than offline. Online advertising encourages and rewards the collection 
of user data (the more data a service has on a user the more effectively it can target adverts 
at them) and the holding of people’s attention (the longer they use a service the more adverts 
they see).
1.37 This combination of factors has given rise to a number of issues caused by or related to 
online advertising. Work is already underway to address some of these:
 • A Home Office-led working group on CSEA and terrorist content linked to 
advertising met in March 2019, following an initial meeting in December 2018, 
comprising representatives from advertising trade bodies, agencies, brands, law 
enforcement and the IWF. The working group’s activity to date comprises actions 
to help ensure advertising is not supporting this kind of illegal activity. 
 • As part of the government’s Childhood Obesity Plan, DCMS and the Department 
of Health and Social Care launched a consultation on 18 March 2019 on 
introducing a 9pm watershed on TV advertising of products high in fat, salt or 
sugar, and similar protections for children viewing adverts online.
 • The Competition and Markets Authority is considering further work on digital 
advertising, although this is dependent on the outcome of EU exit negotiations. 
 • In November 2018 the Advertising Standards Authority published its strategy More 
Impact Online, which aims to put the protection of consumers online at the heart of 
its work over the next five years, and makes commitments to explore, for example, 
the use of machine learning and AI to improve regulation. 
 • In 2018, the ICO conducted an investigation into data analytics and micro targeting 
of political advertising online. The report, ‘Democracy Disrupted?’, highlighted the 
risks of personal data being abused in digital campaigning and made a number 
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of recommendations to improve transparency and data protection compliance. 
The ICO has also commenced a broader examination of the use of personal data 
in adtech.54
1.38 As announced in the DCMS Secretary of State’s immediate response to the Cairncross 
Review, DCMS will conduct a review of how online advertising is regulated in the UK.
54 ICO (2018). Democracy disrupted? Personal information and political influence. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/
action-weve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf 
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2: The harms in scope
Summary 
 • This White Paper sets out government action to tackle online content or activity that 
harms individual users, particularly children, or threatens our way of life in the UK, 
either by undermining national security, or by reducing trust and undermining our 
shared rights, responsibilities and opportunities to foster integration. It sets out an 
initial list of content and behaviour which will be in scope, as well as a list of harms 
which will be excluded.
 • There is currently a patchwork of regulation and voluntary initiatives aimed at 
addressing these problems, but these have not gone far or fast enough to keep UK 
users safe online. 
 • Many of our international partners are also developing new regulatory approaches to 
tackle online harms, but the UK will be the first to tackle online harms in a coherent, 
single regulatory framework that reflects our commitment to a free, open and 
secure internet.
Harmful content or activity in scope of the White Paper
2.1 Table 1 below shows the initial list of online harmful content or activity in scope of 
the White Paper, based on an assessment of their prevalence and impact on individuals 
and society. 
2.2 This list is, by design, neither exhaustive nor fixed. A static list could prevent swift 
regulatory action to address new forms of online harm, new technologies, content and new 
online activities. 
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Table 1: Online harms in scope 
Harms with a 
clear definition
Harms with a less 
clear definition
Underage exposure to 
legal content
• Child sexual exploitation 
and abuse.
• Terrorist content and 
activity.
• Organised immigration 
crime.
• Modern slavery.
• Extreme pornography.
• Revenge pornography.
• Harassment and 
cyberstalking.
• Hate crime.
• Encouraging or assisting 
suicide.
• Incitement of violence.
• Sale of illegal goods/
services, such as drugs 
and weapons (on the open 
internet).
• Content illegally uploaded 
from prisons.
• Sexting of indecent images 
by under 18s (creating, 
possessing, copying or 
distributing indecent or 
sexual images of children 
and young people under 
the age of 18).
• Cyberbullying and trolling.
• Extremist content and 
activity.
• Coercive behaviour.
• Intimidation.
• Disinformation.
• Violent content.
• Advocacy of self-harm.
• Promotion of Female 
Genital Mutilation (FGM).
• Children accessing pornography.
• Children accessing inappropriate material 
(including under 13s using social media 
and under 18s using dating apps; 
excessive screen time).
2.3 There is already an effective response to some categories of harmful content or activity 
online. These will be excluded from the scope of the new regulatory framework to avoid 
duplication of existing government activity.
2.4 The following harms will be excluded from scope:
 • All harms to organisations, such as companies, as opposed to harms suffered 
by individuals. This excludes harms relating to most aspects of competition law, 
most cases of intellectual property violation, and the organisational response to 
many cases of fraudulent activity. The government is leading separate initiatives to 
tackle these issues. For example, the Joint Fraud Taskforce is leading an ambitious 
programme of work to tackle fraud, including online fraud, through partnership 
between banks, law enforcement and government.
 • All harms suffered by individuals that result directly from a breach of the data 
protection legislation, including distress arising from intrusion, harm from unfair 
processing, and any financial losses. Box 16 explains how the UK’s legal 
framework provides protection against online harms linked to data breaches.
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 • All harms suffered by individuals resulting directly from a breach of cyber security 
or hacking. These harms are addressed through the government’s National Cyber 
Security Strategy.
 • All harms suffered by individuals on the dark web rather than the open internet. 
These harms are addressed in the government’s Serious and Organised 
Crime Strategy. A law enforcement response to criminality on the dark web is 
considered the most effective response to the threat. As set out in the strategy, the 
government continues to invest in specialist law enforcement skills and capability. 
Stronger regulation of personal data online Box 16
The UK already enjoys high standards of data protection law, that were modernised 
in 2018 with the introduction of the GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018. The 
government chose to go further than other countries, by providing stronger powers to 
apply to the investigation and enforcement of specific online threats.
Key protections for online harms involving personal data include:
 • An obligation to provide clear and accessible privacy information, tailored for children 
when they are the users of online services.
 • A legal obligation to accountability, making companies responsible for placing data 
protection at the centre of the design of online services in a way that mitigates the risk 
to users’ information. This also includes a requirement to undertake data protection 
impact assessments, and have them approved by the ICO where high risks persist.
 • A right to erasure of personal data online, with stronger provisions where data has 
been gathered from a child user.
 • An age-appropriate design code, which gives the design standards we will expect 
providers of online services and apps used by children to meet when they process 
their data.
 • A power to inspect algorithms in situ, to understand their use of personal data and 
whether this leads to bias or other detriment.
 • A power to require information to be handed over to the ICO wherever it is held, 
including on cloud servers.
Shortcomings of the current regulatory landscape 
2.5 Currently there is a range of UK regulations aimed at specific online harms or services 
in scope of the White Paper, but this creates a fragmented regulatory environment which 
is insufficient to meet the full breadth of the challenges we face. The current regulatory 
framework includes: 
 • GDPR and the Data Protection Act enforced by the ICO. This includes collection 
and use of personal data, including when online. The GDPR also has extraterritorial 
scope and can be enforced against companies outside the UK who offer services 
to UK users.55
55 The Information Commissioner’s Office. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/ 
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 • The Electoral Commission’s oversight of the activity of political parties, and other 
campaigners, including activity on social media.56 
 • Forthcoming age verification requirements for online pornography.57
 • The Equality and Human Rights Commission’s oversight of the Equality Act 2010 
and Freedom of Expression.58
 • Ofcom’s existing oversight of video-on-demand services.59
 • The revised EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive, which will introduce new 
high-level requirements for video sharing platforms such as YouTube.60 
 • The Gambling Commission’s licensing and regulation of online gambling.61 DCMS 
has been working with the Commission to tighten advertising rules on gambling 
and launched GAMSTOP, the online self-exclusion scheme. Additional age-
verification requirements are expected to come take effect in from May this year62. 
 • The Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) enforcement of consumer 
protection law online. See Box 17 for further details.
Consumer enforcement by the Competition and Markets Authority Box 17
Businesses risk breaching consumer protection law where their online behaviour 
misleads consumers or treats them unfairly. The CMA has undertaken a range of recent 
enforcement activity examining potentially unfair or misleading online behaviour, including:
 • Online gambling – the CMA worked with the Gambling Commission to sanction unfair 
online ‘bonus’ promotions by major gambling firms. The CMA was concerned that 
players’ money could effectively be trapped under the terms of these promotions, or 
that they could be caught out by unclear or imbalanced promotion rules. Changes 
were agreed with a number of firms, including William Hill and Ladbrokes. 
 • Online reviews and endorsements – the CMA has an ongoing programme of work 
to tackle fake or misleading online reviews and endorsements. Most recently, 
16 celebrities, reality stars and social media influencers committed to always be clear 
56 The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) provides the Electoral Commission with the 
powers and functions to regulate political finance in the UK. Electoral law is also enforced by the police, who lead on 
the Representation of the People Act offences. The Electoral Commission has powers to investigate breaches of the 
rules to funding and spending for election and referendum campaigns, which includes digital campaigning.
57 The Digital Economy Act 2017 provides for the regulation of providers of online commercial pornography to ensure 
that pornographic material is not normally accessible by those under 18, and that content which is deemed to be 
extreme pornographic material is not made available to any user. The BBFC is the designated regulator. These 
requirements will come into force shortly. 
58 The Equality and Human Rights Commission. Equality Act 2010. Available at: https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/
en/equality-act/equality-act-2010 
59 The EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010 provides Ofcom with the power to regulate editorial content 
(programming) on UK ‘video-on-demand’ services – overseeing compliance on content requirements that cover 
protecting under 18s, preventing incitement to hate, and commercial references in programmes.
60 The EU’s revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (2018) will place requirements on ‘video sharing platforms’ to 
take ‘appropriate measures’ to protect minors from harmful content, protect the general public from illegal content 
and content that incites violence and/or hatred, and will introduce basic requirements around advertising. A regulator 
is still being selected, and these requirements are scheduled to come into force by September 2020.
61 The Gambling Act 2005 provides the Gambling Commission with powers to license and regulate all forms of 
gambling, including online gambling.
62 From May 2019, the Gambling Commission will bring in changes that mean that age and identity must be verified 
before consumers can deposit money and gamble, and will require age verification before customers can access 
free-to-play demo games.
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in their social media posts where they have been paid to post content online. The 
CMA is now examining the responsibility of social media platforms to ensure that 
paid-for content is always properly disclosed. 
 • Secondary tickets – as a result of action by the CMA, including court proceedings 
against Viagogo, consumers will always receive essential information before they 
purchase a ticket from online resale platforms, in particular if there is a risk that the 
consumer will not be able to get into the event or venue. The court order secured 
against Viagogo also requires that ‘pressure selling’ messages are removed from 
their website. 
 • Online hotel booking – the CMA recently agreed changes with companies in the 
Booking.com and Expedia corporate groups in relation to potentially misleading 
online practices. These include new requirements to be clear about the role that 
commission plays in the order of search results and that any claims about the limited 
availability of hotel rooms are accurate and do not risk misleading consumers.
2.6 Under the current liability regime, which is derived from the EU’s e-Commerce Directive, 
platforms are protected from legal liability for any illegal content they ‘host’ (rather than create) 
until they have either actual knowledge of it or are aware of facts or circumstances from which 
it would have been apparent that it was unlawful, and have failed to act ‘expeditiously’ to 
remove or disable access to it. In other words, they are not liable for a piece of user-generated 
illegal content until they have received a notification of its existence, or if their technology 
has identified such content, and have subsequently failed to remove it from their services in 
good time. 
2.7 For illegal harms, it is also important to make sure that criminal law applies online in the 
same way as it applies offline. In February 2018 the Prime Minister announced a review by 
the Law Commission of the law in relation to abusive and offensive online communications, 
to highlight any gaps in the criminal law which cause problems in tackling this abuse. In 
its scoping report last year, the Law Commission concluded that behaviour is broadly 
criminalised to the same extent online as offline and recommended a clarification of existing 
communication offences. The government is now finalising the details of the second phase of 
the Law Commission work. 
2.8 For legal harms, the same piece of content can be subject to different regulatory 
standards depending on the platform on which it appears. Ofcom’s report Addressing 
Harmful Content Online sets out how the same programme would be regulated to differing 
degrees depending on whether it is broadcast on TV, viewed on-demand, or on an 
online video sharing platform (see Box 18). This means that there are significant gaps in 
consumer protection.63 
63 Ofcom (2018). Addressing Harmful Online Content. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/phones-telecoms-and-
internet/information-for-industry/online-policy-research/addressing-harmful-online-content
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Regulation of the same content on different services Box 18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Addressing Harmful Content Online, Ofcom 2018.
Voluntary approaches
2.9 Beyond this range of regulatory requirements, the government’s Internet Safety Strategy 
Green Paper, published in 2017, focused on a voluntary approach to countering harmful 
behaviour and content online. The green paper recognised that government alone cannot 
keep citizens safe from online harms, and sought to work in close partnership with industry to 
put in place specific technical solutions to make social media platforms safer.
2.10 Voluntary initiatives between government, industry and civil society are promising 
in some areas, and the leading companies have taken a number of steps to improve their 
platforms, for example as set out in Boxes 19-21. We are clear that the progress made on 
terrorism and CSEA through this voluntary cooperation with the industry must continue, 
alongside the development of a new regulatory framework. 
Statutory regulation
(more limited standards than live TV, covering 
only protection of children, incitement to 
hatred and product placement/sponsorship) 
Dutch Media Authority regulates as Netflix 
HQ are based in the Netherlands
Subscription services:
watching on demand
Statutory regulation
(when a service broadcasts live TV it is 
required to have an Ofcom licence and 
comply with the full Broadcasting Code)
Live TV
No regulation**
(new European legislation will introduce 
regulation for the first time in 2020, 
conducted by the relevant national authority**)
Video sharing
platforms
Statutory regulation
(more limited standards than live TV, covering 
only protection of children, incitement to 
hatred and product placement/sponsorship)
Catch-up TV
ITV programme
viewed on a tablet
Statutory regulation
(when a service broadcasts live TV it is 
required to have an Ofcom licence and 
comply with the full Broadcasting Code)
Subscription services:
streaming live
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Existing initiatives to tackle online harms: Global Internet Forum to  Box 19 
Counter Terrorism
Following the Westminster terrorist attack in March 2017, the government convened 
a roundtable with major industry players, including Facebook, Twitter, Google and 
Microsoft to see what more could be done to tackle terrorist content online. This led to 
these companies setting up the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) in 
June 2017. 
The GIFCT is leading the cross-industry response to reduce the availability of terrorist 
content on the internet so that there are no safe spaces for terrorists online. Key 
objectives for the Forum are to increase the use of automation and machine learning 
technology to detect and remove terrorist content – ultimately preventing terrorist content 
being made available to users in the first place – and supporting smaller, less well-
resourced companies to tackle these threats on their own platforms. 
The Forum has taken some positive steps since its establishment, but there is still much 
more to do. The government wants to see an ambitious and tangible plan for delivery. 
Our aims for the GIFCT in 2019 are for the Forum to:
 • Expand its membership, securing a greater range and quantity of companies to sign 
up as members of the Forum.
 • Devote greater efforts to targeted interventions with priority platforms, including 
through the development and sharing of automated technology.
 • Put in place a clear programme of activity, providing metrics against which success 
can be measured.
 • Provide greater visibility to drive this agenda forward, including companies having a 
clearer public voice on the issue.
Existing initiatives to tackle online harms: UK Council for Internet Safety Box 20
The UK Council for Internet Safety (UKCIS) is a new collaborative forum through which 
government, the tech community and civil society work together to ensure the UK is the 
safest place in the world to be online.
Expanding the scope of the former UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), UKCIS 
works to tackle online harms such as hate crime, extremism and violence against women 
and girls, in addition to maintaining a focus on the needs of children.
Priority areas of delivery for UKCIS over the next year include:
 • Producing a landscape review of research around adult online harms, and regular 
concise summaries of emerging research.
 • Updated guidance to schools on sexting, and evaluation of online safety provision, 
and for Initial Teacher Training providers to help them upskill new teachers in 
online safety. 
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 • Promoting the Connected World framework, which describes the digital knowledge 
and skills that children should have the opportunity to develop at different stages of 
their lives.
 • A digital resilience framework and toolkit to help families, educators, policymakers, 
frontline service workers and the industry better support users online, across a wide 
range of harms.
Existing initiatives to tackle online harms: WePROTECT Global Alliance Box 21
The WePROTECT Global Alliance (WPGA) was established in recognition that CSEA is a 
global crime requiring a global response.
The UK government played a key role in establishing WPGA and is its sole financial 
donor. WPGA aims to protect more children, apprehend more perpetrators of abuse and 
make the internet free from child sexual exploitation. Eighty-five countries are members 
of WPGA, along with 20 global technology companies and 25 leading non-governmental 
organisations.
The success of the UK government funded WPGA is that it has brought together 
government, law enforcement, industry and civil society to take a stand against online 
child sexual exploitation.
2.11 In the Government Response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper consultation, 
we noted that only a relatively small group of the larger companies are engaged with the 
government’s work on online safety, even though online harms can and do occur across 
many websites. There is also a wide variation in the extent, efficacy and pace of actions by 
companies to tackle online harms. Some companies rely on user moderation to oversee 
reported violations of their terms and conditions, such as Reddit; others employ teams of 
moderators or deploy technology to monitor content, such as Facebook.
2.12 Many companies claim to hold a strong track record on online safety but there is 
limited transparency about how they implement or enforce their policies, and there is a 
persistent mismatch with users’ experiences – 70% of Britons believe that social media 
companies do not do enough to prevent illegal or unethical behaviours on their platforms.64 
60% of respondents to our Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper consultation had witnessed 
inappropriate or harmful behaviour online; only 41% thought their reported concerns were 
taken seriously by social media companies.65 
2.13 At present many online companies rely on using their terms and conditions as the basis 
by which to judge complaints. In practice however, companies’ terms and conditions are 
often difficult for users to understand, and safety policies are not consistent across different 
64 Edelman (2018). Edelman Trust Barometer – UK Findings. Available at: https://www.edelman.co.uk/magazine/posts/
edelman-trust-barometer-2018/
65 HM Government (2018). Government Response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper. May 2018. Available 
at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/708873/
Government_Response_to_the_Internet_Safety_Strategy_Green_Paper_-_Final.pdf
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platforms, with take-down times, description of harms and reporting processes varying. 
A series of investigations have highlighted the risk of serious shortcomings in the training, 
working conditions and support provided for content moderators.66
2.14 There is no mechanism to hold companies to account when they fail to tackle 
breaches. There is no formal, wide-reaching industry forum to improve coordination on terms 
and conditions. The absence of clear standards for what companies should do to tackle 
harms on their services makes it difficult for users to understand or uphold their rights. 
2.15 The government believes that voluntary efforts have not led to adequate or consistent 
steps to protect British citizens online. As highlighted above, users’ own experiences confirm 
a sense of vulnerability online. 
An international approach
2.16 The threat posed by harmful and illegal content and activity online is a global one, and 
many of our international partners are also developing new regulatory approaches to tackle 
online harms. Box 22 sets out what some other countries are doing in this area. 
International approaches to countering online harms Box 22
Germany adopted its Network Enforcement Act (‘NetzDG’) in 2017. This law requires 
online platforms with more than two million registered users in Germany to remove 
‘manifestly unlawful’ content, which contravenes specific elements of the German 
criminal code, such as holocaust denial and hate speech, within 24 hours of receiving 
a notification or complaint, and to remove all other ‘unlawful’ content within seven days 
of notification. Non-compliance risks a fine of up to €50 million. This law also seeks to 
increase platform responsibility through imposing greater transparency and significant 
reporting obligations.
Australia established an eSafety Commissioner through its Enhancing Online Safety for 
Children Act in 2015. The eSafety Commissioner is responsible for promoting online 
safety for all Australians. As well as offering a complaints service for young people who 
experience serious cyber bullying, its remit includes identifying and removing illegal online 
content and tackling image-based abuse.
The European Commission, led by DG JUST, published in September 2018 a proposal 
on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online – Member States agreed a 
Council version of the text in December 2018. The aim of the proposal is to ensure a 
consistent approach across industry to the removal of online terrorist content by Hosting 
Service Providers, for example social media platforms and video sharing sites. There 
are similarities in the approach taken to the framework proposed in this White Paper – 
as currently drafted it looks to take a proportionate approach to setting requirements, 
introduce duties of care on companies, and implementing a transparency framework.
Over 2018, the EU Commission, led by DG CNECT, also published its Action Plan against 
Disinformation. The Commission collaborated with companies including Facebook, 
Google and Twitter to produce a code of practice against disinformation. This resulted 
in commitments to improve the transparency of political advertising, prevent the misuse 
66 The Verge (2019). The Trauma Floor. Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-
facebook-content-moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona 
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of automated bots and to invest in tools to amplify diverse perspectives. The UK 
government has previously indicated its support for the measures and will continue to 
collaborate internationally on this issue.
2.17 The government is working closely with international partners as we develop our 
own approach that reflects our shared values and commitment to a free, open and secure 
internet. The approach proposed in this White Paper is the first attempt globally to tackle 
this range of online harms in a coherent, single regulatory framework. We will continue to 
share experiences and seek to work with international partners. Further details are set out in 
Chapter 6. 
Existing initiatives to tackle online harms: Project Arachnid Box 23
The government has invested £600,000 into Project Arachnid, a groundbreaking project 
that trawls the web to identify web pages with suspected child sexual abuse material. The 
technology can be deployed across websites, forums, chat services and newsgroups 
to instantaneously detect illegal content, before sending a take-down notice to service 
providers so they can quickly protect children from further exploitation. 
Project Arachnid is the product of a partnership with the Canadian Centre for Child 
Protection and the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, demonstrating 
the UK’s determination to work with international partners to tackle harmful activity online. 
To date, Arachnid has trawled 1.5 billion webpages, detected 7.5 million suspected 
images of child sexual abuse and issued more than 1 million take-down notices for the 
removal of child abuse material on the open web67.
67 Live dashboard data, data taken on 21 March 2019.
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PART 2: Regulatory model
3. A new regulatory framework 
Summary
 • The government will establish a new statutory duty of care to make companies take 
more responsibility for the safety of their users and tackle harm caused by content 
or activity on their services. Compliance with this duty of care will be overseen and 
enforced by an independent regulator.
 • Companies must fulfil their new legal duties. The regulator will set out how to do this 
in codes of practice. If companies want to fulfil these duties in a manner not set out 
in the codes, they will have to explain and justify to the regulator how their alternative 
approach will effectively deliver the same or greater level of impact.
 • Regarding the threat to national security or the physical safety of children, the 
government will have the power to direct the regulator in relation to codes of practice 
relating to terrorist activity or CSEA online, and these codes must be signed off by the 
Home Secretary. 
 • For all codes of practice relating to illegal harms, including incitement of violence 
and the sale of illegal goods and weapons, there will be a clear expectation that the 
regulator will work with law enforcement and other relevant government agencies to 
ensure the codes adequately keep pace with the threat. 
 • Developing a culture of transparency, trust and accountability will be a critical element 
of the new regulatory framework. The regulator will have the power to require annual 
transparency reports from companies in scope, outlining the prevalence of harmful 
content on their platforms and what measures they are taking to address this. These 
reports will be published online by the regulator, so that users and parents can make 
informed decisions about online use. The regulator will also have powers to require 
additional information, including about the operation of algorithms. 
 • The regulator will encourage and oversee the fulfilment of companies’ commitments 
to improve the ability of independent researchers to access their data, subject to 
appropriate safeguards. 
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 • As part of the new duty of care, we will expect companies, where appropriate, to 
have an effective and easy-to-access user complaints function. The regulator will 
require companies to respond to user complaints within an appropriate timeframe 
and to take action consistent with the expectations set out in the regulatory 
framework. 
 • But we also recognise the importance of an independent review mechanism to 
ensure that users have confidence that their concerns are being treated fairly. We are 
consulting on allowing designated bodies to make ‘super complaints’ to defend the 
needs of users. 
 • Ahead of the implementation of the new regulatory framework, we will encourage 
companies to take early action to address online harms. To assist this, the White 
Paper sets out high-level expectations of companies, including some specific 
expectations in relation to certain harms. We expect the regulator to reflect these in 
future codes of practice. 
 • Where there is a threat to national security or the physical safety of children, such as 
CSEA and terrorism, we will expect companies to go much further and demonstrate 
the steps taken to combat the dissemination of associated content and illegal 
behaviours. We will publish interim codes of practice providing guidance about 
tackling terrorist activity and online CSEA later this year.
3.1 The government will establish a new statutory duty of care on relevant companies 
to take reasonable steps to keep their users safe and tackle illegal and harmful activity on 
their services. 
3.2 The fulfilment of this duty will be overseen and enforced by an independent regulator.
3.3 This statutory duty of care will require companies to take reasonable steps to keep users 
safe, and prevent other persons coming to harm as a direct consequence of activity on their 
services. This broader application of the duty, beyond simply users of a particular service, 
recognises that in some cases the victims of harmful activity – victims of the sharing of non-
consensual images, for example – may not themselves be users of the service where the 
harmful activity took place. This duty will apply to all of the harms included in the scope of the 
White Paper, as set out below. 
3.4 A key element of the regulator’s approach will be the principle of proportionality. 
Companies will be required to take action proportionate to the severity and scale of the harm 
in question. The regulator will be required to assess the action of companies according to 
their size and resources, and the age of their users. 
3.5 The regulatory approach will impose more specific and stringent requirements for 
those harms which are clearly illegal, than for those harms which may be legal but harmful, 
depending on the context.
3.6 Companies must fulfil their new legal duties. The regulator will set out how to do this 
in codes of practice. The codes will outline the systems, procedures, technologies and 
investment, including in staffing, training and support of human moderators, that companies 
need to adopt to help demonstrate that they have fulfilled their duty of care to their users. 
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Companies will still need to be compliant with the overarching duty of care even where a 
specific code does not exist, for example assessing and responding to the risk associated 
with emerging harms or technology. 
3.7 There will be a strong expectation that companies follow the guidance set out in these 
codes. If they choose not to do so, companies will have to explain and justify to the regulator 
how their alternative approach will effectively deliver the same or greater level of impact. 
This approach is familiar to companies, for example the UK Corporate Governance Code68 
and the ICO’s code of practice on data sharing. Though these codes will be developed with 
the companies and other stakeholders in an open and transparent way, the regulator will 
ultimately decide on their content. 
3.8 The regulator will assess whether companies have fulfilled their duty of care, including 
by reference to relevant codes of practice, and compliance with the company’s own relevant 
terms and conditions. Failure to meet these obligations may result in enforcement action by 
the regulator. Further details on enforcement are in Chapter 6.
3.9 The regulator will also expect companies to make clear how they are fulfilling their 
statutory duty of care. Relevant terms and conditions will be required to be sufficiently clear 
and accessible, including to children and other vulnerable users. The regulator will assess how 
effectively these terms are enforced as part of any regulatory action. 
Terrorism and CSEA online
3.10 Companies will be required to take particularly robust action to tackle terrorist use of 
the internet and online CSEA. The government will have the power to issue directions to the 
regulator regarding the content of the codes of practice for these harms, and will also approve 
the draft codes before they are brought into effect. Similarly, the regulator will not normally 
agree to companies adopting proposals which diverge from these two codes of practice, and 
will require a high burden of proof that alternative proposals will be effective. 
3.11 Between the publication of this White Paper and the establishment of a regulator, the 
government will work with law enforcement and other relevant bodies to produce interim 
codes of practice for online terrorist content and CSEA. These codes will be published later 
this year. 
General monitoring
3.12 The regulator will not compel companies to undertake general monitoring of all 
communications on their online services, as this would be a disproportionate burden on 
companies and would raise concerns about user privacy. The government believes that there 
is however, a strong case for mandating specific monitoring that targets where there is a 
threat to national security or the physical safety of children, such as CSEA and terrorism. 
Transparency, trust and accountability 
3.13 Developing a culture of transparency, trust and accountability, and consistent standards 
of transparency, will be a critical element of the new regulatory framework. 
68 Financial Reporting Council (2018). UK Corporate Governance Code. Available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/
corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governance-code
44  Online Harms White Paper
3.14 In May 2018, the Government Response to the Internet Safety Strategy Green 
Paper consultation set out the role transparency and reporting must play in building our 
understanding of the extent of online harms and how effectively companies are tackling 
breaches in their terms and conditions. 
3.15 Alongside this response, we published a draft transparency reporting template and 
began a series of engagements with industry. This process, which has included discussion 
with over 20 companies, has provided some helpful insights into current industry action. 
It is encouraging that more companies have since started publishing their own global 
transparency reports. We will publish the government’s first annual transparency report later 
this year.
3.16 At the same time, we indicated that transparency reporting was one of the potential 
areas for new legislation. Greater transparency will ensure:
 • The regulator can gain an understanding of the level of harms on online platforms 
and the mitigating action being taken by companies. This will inform its regulatory 
priorities and determine the effectiveness of, and compliance with, different 
regulatory measures.
 • Users can gain a greater understanding and awareness of whether and to what 
extent companies are taking positive steps to keep their users safe, and the 
processes different companies have in place to prevent harms.
 • Companies take responsibility for the impacts of their platforms and products on 
their users. It will incentivise accountability within the industry.
3.17 To inform its reports and to guide its regulatory action, the regulator will have the power 
to require annual reports from companies covering the following areas:
 • Evidence of effective enforcement of the company’s own relevant terms and 
conditions, which should reflect guidance issued by the regulator in its codes 
of practice.
 • Processes that the company has in place for reporting illegal and harmful content 
and behaviour, the number of reports received and how many of those reports led 
to action. 
 • Proactive use of technological tools, where appropriate, to identify, flag, block or 
remove illegal or harmful content.
 • Measures and safeguards in place to uphold and protect fundamental rights, 
ensuring decisions to remove content, block and/or delete accounts are well-
founded, especially when automated tools are used and that users have an 
effective route of appeal. 
 • Where relevant, evidence of cooperation with UK law enforcement and other 
relevant government agencies, regulatory bodies and public agencies.
 • Details of investment to support user education and awareness of online harms, 
including through collaboration with civil society, small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and other companies.
3.18 The regulator will produce and publish an annual transparency report outlining key 
data on companies’ performance against their duty of care and the prevalence of harms 
on different platforms. It will also publish companies’ transparency reports on its website, 
ensuring these are easily accessible to the public so that users and parents can make 
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informed decisions about online use. Where the regulator has required companies to produce 
transparency reports, it will be mandatory to provide them; failure to do so will result in 
enforcement action (as set out in Chapter 6). 
3.19 The regulator will use insight from users, civil society, government, law enforcement and 
other relevant government agencies, and other regulators to inform its understanding of the 
prevalence and impact of online harms, and the effectiveness of companies’ responses. 
3.20 As well as the power to require annual reports from companies, the regulator will have 
the power to require additional information from them to inform its oversight or enforcement 
activity, and to establish requirements to disclose information. It may also undertake thematic 
reviews of areas of concern, for example a review into the treatment of self-harm or suicide 
related content. The regulator will have the power to require companies to share research that 
they hold or have commissioned that shows that their activities may cause harm.
3.21 The regulator will build on government engagement with companies to understand how 
best to establish comparable data-points and reporting between platforms. 
3.22 As part of a movement towards greater transparency, companies should also work 
in conjunction with the regulator to build a shared understanding of the mechanics of 
their associated platforms or services. Where necessary, to establish that companies are 
adequately fulfilling the duty of care, the regulator will have the power to request explanations 
about the way algorithms operate. The regulator may, for example, require companies to 
demonstrate how algorithms select content for children, and to provide the means for testing 
the operation of these algorithms.
3.23 In determining where such explanations will be appropriate and what form they should 
take, the regulator will work closely with the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, the 
expert body that has been set up to advise government on the regulation of data, including 
algorithmic tools. Appropriate safeguards will be needed to ensure commercial confidentiality, 
although the regulator is unlikely to require direct access to companies’ proprietary codes if 
necessary explanations have been provided. 
3.24 Several of the largest companies have promised access for independent researchers 
to anonymised information, in line with data protection requirements. This is a positive step, 
although it is as yet unclear whether these promises have been fulfilled. The government 
welcomes these steps, and believes that this level of transparency to researchers is a 
necessary part of developing the increased understanding of online harms. We will task 
the regulator with encouraging this approach, and ensuring companies make relevant 
information available.
3.25 We will expect the regulator to foster a culture of cooperation between companies 
and to encourage companies, especially the larger ones, to share information about online 
harms. Users perpetrating harm often move between platforms, especially to behave illegally 
and disseminate illegal content. A greater level of cooperation between platforms by sharing 
observations and best practices to prevent harms spreading from one provider to another will 
be essential. 
Consultation questions
Question 1: This government has committed to annual transparency reporting. Beyond the 
measures set out in this White Paper, should the government do more to build a culture of 
transparency, trust and accountability across industry and, if so, what?
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User redress
3.26 Many companies claim a strong track record on online safety, but responses to our 
Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper showed that this is at odds with users’ experiences. To 
fulfil the new duty of care, we will expect companies, where appropriate, to have an effective 
and easy-to-access complaints function, allowing users to raise either concerns about specific 
pieces of harmful content or activity, or wider concerns that the company has breached its 
duty of care. Users should receive timely, clear and transparent responses to their complaints, 
and there must be an internal appeals function. The regulator will have oversight of these 
processes, including through transparency information about the volume and outcome of 
complaints, and the power to require improvements where necessary. Box 24 explains users’ 
rights under the proposed requirements.
3.27 In addition to the internal appeals processes, we recognise that independent review 
or resolution mechanisms may be appropriate in some circumstances. This would increase 
the accountability of companies and help rebuild users’ trust. We are consulting on the 
following option:
 • Whether a provision should be made in legislation for designated bodies to 
bring ‘super complaints’ to the regulator for consideration, in specific and clearly 
evidenced circumstances. This could be an important safeguard in the user 
redress process and we are also consulting on when such complaints would 
be appropriate and most effective, and on the bodies or groups that may be 
empowered to bring them. 
3.28 We would also welcome views during the consultation process on additional options 
for redress. 
Consultation questions
Question 2: Should designated bodies be able to bring ‘super complaints’ to the regulator in 
specific and clearly evidenced circumstances?
  Question 2a: If your answer to question 2 is ‘yes’, in what circumstances should 
this happen?
Question 3: What, if any, other measures should the government consider for users who wish 
to raise concerns about specific pieces of harmful content or activity, and/or breaches of the 
duty of care? 
3.29 Under current arrangements, individuals can, in principle, obtain remedies in court 
against companies where they are negligent or breach their contract with the individual but 
such legal actions can face difficulties. For example, difficulties in establishing the company’s 
duty of care to the person bringing the claim, showing a causal link between their activities 
and harm caused, or obtaining factual evidence. Our regulatory model will provide evidence 
and set standards which may increase the effectiveness of individuals’ existing legal remedies.
3.30 The regulator’s primary role in the user redress process will be to oversee the 
requirement on relevant companies to have appropriate and effective internal complaints 
processes, including consideration of whether there should be an appeals function in certain 
circumstances. The regulator would also determine any ‘super complaints’ process and 
designate bodies. We do not envisage a role for the regulator itself in determining disputes 
between individuals and companies, but where users raise concerns with the regulator, it will 
be able to use this information as part of its consideration of whether there may be systemic 
failings which justify enforcement action. We will also require the regulator to take the interests 
of users into consideration. 
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Regulation in practice: User redress: how the regulatory framework will  Box 24 
work for individuals
At the moment, individuals can raise complaints and concerns about harmful online 
activity with companies, but processes vary and provision is patchy across the industry. 
Some companies do not have effective means to address user concerns, and it is not 
always clear what response, if any, a user will receive. Only two in five respondents to the 
government’s consultation on the Internet Safety Strategy felt their concerns were taken 
seriously by social media companies. The regulatory framework proposed in this White 
Paper will give individuals new avenues to pursue complaints: 
1.  Right to an internal complaints procedure that meets standards set out by the 
regulator. Where appropriate, companies covered by the regulator will be required to 
have an effective complaints process, and the regulator will set minimum standards 
for these processes. This means that users will know how they can raise a complaint, 
how long it will take a company to investigate, and what response they can expect 
(including appeal rights). 
2.  Right of redress through an independent process. If the company is unable or 
unwilling to resolve a complaint, or the user is not satisfied with the response, it 
may be appropriate for users to be able to seek redress through an independent 
process. We are seeking views on how this could work in practice, including whether 
the regulator should run a ‘super complaints’ scheme, through which designated 
organisations could raise issues with the regulator on behalf of users. 
3.  The ability to alert the regulator to an alleged breach of a company’s duty of care. 
While the regulator would not normally adjudicate on individual complaints about 
companies, users will be able to report concerns to the regulator. This will be an 
important part of the regulator’s horizon scanning to identify where companies might 
not be fulfilling their duty of care to their users. 
4.  The scope to use the regulator’s findings in any claim against a company in the courts 
on grounds of negligence or breach of contract. And, if the regulator has found a 
breach of the statutory duty of care, that decision and the evidence that has led to it 
will be available to the individual to use in any private legal action.
Role of Parliament 
3.31 It will be important to ensure that Parliament is able to scrutinise the regulator’s work. 
Mechanisms for achieving this will depend in part on whether the regulator is a new or existing 
body but are likely to include, for example, a duty on the regulator to lay its annual report and 
audited accounts before Parliament. The regulator will also have a general responsibility to 
provide Parliament with information about its work, as requested. 
3.32 In addition, we will consider what role Parliament should have in relation to the 
regulator’s codes of practice. Parliament’s role in relation to codes of practice and guidance 
issued by other regulators varies across different regulatory regimes, ranging from formal 
approval to no specific role. We will consider options for the role of Parliament as we develop 
these proposals in more detail. 
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Consultation questions 
Question 4: What role should Parliament play in scrutinising the work of the regulator, 
including the development of codes of practice? 
PART 2: Regulatory model  49
4: Companies in scope of the regulatory framework
Summary
 • The regulatory framework will apply to companies that provide services or tools 
that allow, enable or facilitate users to share or discover user-generated content, or 
interact with each other online. 
 • These services are offered by a wide range of companies, including start-ups and 
SMEs, and other organisations such as charities. 
 • The application of the regulatory requirements and the duty of care model will reflect 
the diversity of organisations in scope and ensure a risk-based and proportionate 
approach. We will minimise excessive burdens, particularly on small businesses and 
civil society organisations.
 • Reflecting the importance of privacy, any requirements to scan or monitor content for 
tightly defined categories of illegal content will not apply to private channels. We are 
consulting on definitions of private communications, and what measures should apply 
to these services.
4.1 Harmful content and behaviour originates from and migrates across a wide range of 
online platforms or services, and these cannot readily be categorised by reference to a single 
business model or sector. Focusing on the services provided by companies, rather than their 
business model or sector, limits the risk that online harms simply move and proliferate outside 
of the ambit of the new regulatory framework. We propose that the regulatory framework 
should apply to companies that allow users to share or discover user-generated content, or 
interact with each other online. 
4.2 There are two main types of online activity that can give rise to the online harms in 
scope or compound their effects:
 • Hosting, sharing and discovery of user-generated content (e.g. a post on a public 
forum or the sharing of a video).
 • Facilitation of public and private online interaction between service users (e.g. 
instant messaging or comments on posts).
4.3 A wide variety of organisations provide these services to users. This will mean 
that companies of all sizes will be in scope of the regulatory framework. The scope will 
include companies from a range of sectors, including social media companies, public 
discussion forums, retailers that allow users to review products online, along with non-profit 
organisations, file sharing sites and cloud hosting providers. 
4.4 This comprehensive approach is important for the efficacy of the new regulatory 
framework. 
4.5 We also recognise the importance of minimising undue burdens on organisations in 
scope and of avoiding uncertainty about how regulation will apply. To ensure a proportionate 
approach and avoid being overly burdensome, the application of the regulatory requirements 
and the duty of care model will reflect the diversity of organisations in scope, their capacities, 
and what is technically possible in terms of proactive measures, including for those providing 
ancillary services such as caching (the process of temporarily storing data in either a 
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software or hardware ‘cache’). While we will minimise excessive burdens according to the 
size and resources of organisations, all companies will be required to take reasonable and 
proportionate action to tackle harms on their services. The regulator will ensure that there 
is clarity about what the regulatory regime means in practice for different company’s, and 
will not impose new requirements where there is no evidence of harm. A range of proposed 
initiatives to counter regulatory burdens are set out in Chapter 6. 
Regulatory approach to private communications
4.6 Defining ‘private’ and ‘public’ in the online space is complex from a technical and legal 
standpoint. For example, there is an obvious difference between one-to-one messaging, 
and a WhatsApp group of several hundred users. However, users should be protected from 
harmful content or behaviour wherever it occurs online, and criminals should not be able 
to exploit the online space to conduct illegal activity. The development of harmful activity 
online frequently involves a combination of activity taking place on both public and private 
communication channels. For example, terrorist propaganda is often disseminated over public 
channels, with activities such as the preparation of terrorist attacks occurring largely on private 
channels. Such private channels are also widely used to store and share images of CSEA, 
or to groom young children, with public channels frequently being where initial contact with a 
child takes place (see Box 25).
4.7 Reflecting the importance of privacy, the framework will also ensure a differentiated 
approach for private communication, meaning any requirements to scan or monitor content 
for tightly defined categories of illegal content will not apply to private channels. 
4.8 We are consulting on appropriate definitions and what regulatory requirements can and 
should apply to private communication services alongside this White Paper.
Harm: Child sexual exploitation and abuse – how online grooming moves  Box 25 
across different platforms
Evidence shows how grooming activity often migrates across platforms, luring children 
into less public spaces online:
 • Initial contact with a child is often made after they are identified as a potential victim 
by a groomer on public social media platforms.
 • Offenders may target children based on vulnerabilities such as mental health, or by 
exploiting publicly available information from their social media profiles.
 • The grooming process can be extensive; building rapport and manipulating the 
victim – but it can also move almost immediately into sexual advances.
 • This can involve the groomer then sending the child a message, using the same 
platform’s private messaging service or another private or encrypted messaging 
service, seeking to extort indecent imagery and continue their abuse.
Consultation questions
Question 5: Are proposals for the online platforms and services in scope of the regulatory 
framework a suitable basis for an effective and proportionate approach?
Question 6: In developing a definition for private communications, what criteria should be 
considered?
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Question 7: Which channels or forums that can be considered private should be in scope of 
the regulatory framework?
  Question 7a: What specific requirements might be appropriate to apply to private 
channels and forums in order to tackle online harms?
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PART 3: Regulation in practice
5: A regulator for online safety 
Summary
 • An independent regulator will implement, oversee and enforce the new regulatory 
framework. It will have sufficient resources and the right expertise and capability to 
perform its role effectively. 
 • The regulator will also have broader responsibilities to promote education and 
awareness-raising about online safety, and to promote the development and adoption 
of safety technologies to tackle online harms.
 • The regulator will take a risk-based approach, prioritising action to tackle activity or 
content where there is the greatest evidence or threat of harm, or where children or 
other vulnerable users are at risk. 
 • To support this, the regulator will undertake and commission research to improve the 
evidence base, working closely with UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) and other 
partners. 
 • The regulator will take a proportionate approach, expecting companies to do what is 
reasonable, depending on the nature of the harm and the resources and technology 
available to them. 
 • The regulator will have a legal duty to pay due regard to innovation, and to protect 
users’ rights online, being particularly mindful to not infringe privacy and freedom 
of expression. 
 • The government is consulting on whether the regulator should be a new or existing 
body. The regulator will be funded by the industry in the medium term, and the 
government is exploring options such as fees, charges or an industry levy to put it on 
a sustainable footing.
The functions of the regulator
5.1 The regulatory framework will be implemented, overseen and enforced by an 
independent regulator. This regulator will be equipped with the powers, resources and 
expertise it needs to effectively carry out its role.
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5.2 The regulator’s functions will include: 
 • Setting out what companies need to do to fulfil the duty of care, including through 
codes of practice.
 • Establishing a transparency, trust and accountability framework, backed by 
information-gathering powers, to assess companies’ compliance with the duty of 
care and their own relevant terms and conditions.
 • Providing support to start-ups and SMEs to help them fulfil their legal obligations in 
a proportionate and effective manner.
 • Overseeing the implementation of user redress mechanisms.
 • Taking prompt and effective enforcement action in the event of non-compliance (as 
set out in Chapter 6).
 • Promoting education and awareness-raising about online safety to empower users 
to stay safe online.
 • Promoting the development and adoption of safety technologies to tackle online 
harms.
 • Undertaking and commissioning research to improve our understanding of online 
harms and their impacts on individuals and society. 
A risk-based approach
5.3 The government will require the regulator to adopt a risk-based approach, prioritising 
regulatory action to tackle harms that have the greatest impact on individuals or wider society. 
This will shape the development of codes of practice, monitoring and review of online harms, 
the regulator’s work with industry to develop technological solutions, and enforcement action. 
5.4 The regulator will also focus on companies where there is the greatest risk of harm, 
based on factors such as the type of service – for example, services that enable adult users 
to contact children, services that have large user bases, and services that target or are 
popular with vulnerable groups of users. It will also use evidence of the actual incidence of 
harms on different services and the safety track record of different companies to prioritise 
its resources. The regulator will use its powers to conduct thematic reviews, undertake 
targeted horizon scanning and investigate specific issues to develop its understanding of the 
risk landscape.
5.5 This risk-based approach will mean that the regulator’s initial focus in the first phase 
will be on those companies which pose the biggest and most obvious risk of harm to users, 
either because of the scale of the service’s size or because of known issues with serious 
harms. We expect the regulator to take a proactive approach to assessing compliance 
in these cases, whereas their approach to the full range of companies in scope would 
be focused on providing advice and guidance and taking reactive action in response to 
concerns. This is consistent with the approach in a number of other regulatory regimes, 
including health and safety and financial services.
5.6 The duty of care approach will also mean companies must improve their understanding 
of the risks associated with their services and take effective and proportionate steps to 
mitigate these risks. These steps should be in keeping with the codes of practice set down 
by the regulator. When assessing compliance, the regulator will need to consider whether 
the harm was foreseeable, and therefore what is reasonable to expect a company to have 
done. In the event of a new risk emerging, the company should notify the regulator in order to 
discuss the best approach to mitigation and to share learning across companies.
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A proportionate approach 
5.7 The regulator will take account of the capacity of companies to meet regulatory 
requirements, including the reach of their platforms in terms of user-base and the severity of 
the harms. This proportionate approach will also be enshrined in the legislation by making 
clear that companies must do what is ‘reasonably practicable’ – a test that has underpinned 
the success of health and safety legislation. However, all companies within scope will be 
required to take reasonable and proportionate action to tackle harms on their services, and 
the regulator will set clear expectations of what companies should do to tackle illegal activity 
and to keep children safe online.
5.8 We expect the regulator to comply with principles of regulatory best practice, which 
means that its activities will be sensitive to impacts on competition and small and micro-
businesses in particular (see Box 26).
5.9 The regulator will also be required to support less well-resourced companies, as part of 
its work to develop tools to build capacity amongst companies and users. For example, we 
expect the regulator to work with the industry to encourage the development of technologies 
that aid compliance, and to facilitate cross-sector collaboration and sharing of expertise. 
These technologies could be made available to start-up or small companies. This is part of a 
wider advisory role for the regulator through which it will, for example, provide industry with 
technical information on best practice content moderation processes, or provide toolkits that 
explain common patterns of behaviour by cyberstalkers.
5.10 Through the consultation process alongside this White Paper, we intend to work with 
industry, civil society and the public to look at ways in which we can minimise any excessive 
burdens and provide additional certainty to businesses, and explore what more the regulator 
could do to make compliance straightforward and practicable for all businesses.
Regulation in practice: Better regulation principles and the new  Box 26 
regulatory framework
We need all platforms to take reasonable steps to keep their users safe. Harm can occur 
on small platforms as well as big ones. There is nowhere on the internet where it is 
acceptable to host child sexual abuse material or terrorist material. 
Regulation can impose a disproportionate burden on smaller companies. Badly designed 
regulation can stifle innovation by giving an advantage to large companies that can 
handle compliance more easily. We are determined that this regulatory framework should 
provide strong protection for our citizens while avoiding placing an impossible burden on 
smaller companies. 
We will take five key steps to achieve this:
1.  A proportionate approach. The regulator will take account of the capacity of 
companies to meet regulatory requirements, including their size and the reach of 
their platforms in terms of user-base, as well as the risk and prevalence of harms on 
their service. 
2.  A duty of innovation. The regulator will have a legal duty to pay due regard to 
innovation. This will include implementing the framework in a way that does not 
impose impossible demands on new and challenger companies. This will also ensure 
that start-ups and those developing innovative new products can work with the 
regulator, for example through regulatory sandboxes. 
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3.  Making compliance straightforward. The regulator will be tasked with helping start-ups 
and SMEs fulfil their obligations. We will learn from best practice in other sectors, such 
as the support provided to companies by the Health and Safety Executive or the ICO. 
4.  Using technology. Government will work with the regulator to promote effective 
technological compliance solutions that can be made available to start-ups and small 
businesses. 
5.  Minimising compliance costs. We will explore options to streamline compliance, 
including creating machine executable regulation and facilitating easy, secure 
data sharing.
A legal obligation to support innovation
5.11 The regulator will have a legal obligation to pay due regard to innovation. A similar 
obligation was placed on the ICO under the Data Protection Act 2018. This has allowed the 
regulator to fully implement a robust data protection regime in a pro-innovation way. The 
ICO currently has plans to establish an initiative that will proactively support organisations 
to develop innovative products and services that make use of personal data and benefit 
the public. The ICO will provide this support whether these innovations are at design, proof 
of concept and testing stages, or as further ongoing development of existing innovative 
products/services. This is distinct from the legal requirement of data protection by design. 
We would expect the regulator to explore similar approaches to supporting and encouraging 
innovation in this space, subject to minimum expectations of user safety. This obligation will 
encourage the regulator to take a flexible, proportionate and risk-based approach when 
setting and enforcing expectations and responsibilities for companies. 
Protecting users’ rights online
5.12 The regulator will also have an obligation to protect users’ rights online, particularly 
rights to privacy and freedom of expression. It will ensure that the new regulatory requirements 
do not lead to a disproportionately risk averse response from companies that unduly limits 
freedom of expression, including by limiting participation in public debate. Its regulatory action 
will be required to be fair, reasonable and transparent. 
Empirical approach 
5.13 The new regulator will take an evidence-based approach to regulatory activity. It will 
need to understand the potential impact of technological developments on the companies 
it regulates, as well as users’ experiences of harm. To support this, we expect that it will run 
a regular programme of user consultation, in-depth research projects, and horizon scanning 
activity. It will work with companies to ensure that academics have access to company data 
to undertake research, subject to suitable safeguards. This dynamic approach to evidence 
gathering will help the regulator to assess the changing nature of harms and the risks 
associated with them, and of the places and manner in which they manifest online. 
5.14 The regulator will work closely with UKRI to ensure support for targeted research into 
online harms, and to develop the collective understanding of online harms and the evidence 
base, building on the work of the UKCIS Evidence Group. This will include working with 
relevant aspects of UKRI’s Digital Economy Theme – a partnership between the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and Innovate UK. 
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The regulatory body
5.15 An independent regulator could be set up, either by creating a new body, or by 
altering the remit and functions of an existing organisation. The usual government approval 
processes would apply to the establishment of a new central government regulatory body. 
The government is considering: 
 • A new regulator. Setting up a dedicated new regulator would provide a clear and 
coherent remit to focus on online safety and provide new leadership of online 
safety to industry and the public. A new body would, however, be more costly to 
set up and take longer to become operational and risks further complicating the 
regulatory landscape.
 • An existing regulator. Tasking an existing regulator to assume responsibility 
for online safety would mean that the new regime would start with regulatory 
credibility and make the best use of existing experience and expertise. We would 
assess existing regulators’ suitability based on their current responsibilities, 
the type of regulation they are already responsible for, their track record of 
working successfully within complex sectors, and their capacity to take on new 
responsibilities for online safety, including compatibility with their current legal 
status and operating model. 
5.16 If we were to establish a new, dedicated regulator over the long term, we would need 
to consider options for the interim period, given the time it would take to set up a new body. 
These include empowering an existing regulator for a limited time period (Ofcom would be 
a strong candidate, given its experience in upholding its current remit to tackle harmful or 
offensive content, in the context of TV and radio), or establishing a shadow body that can 
make the necessary preparations ahead of the new authority. Either approach will require 
cooperation with other regulators to ensure the new framework complements existing 
safeguards.
5.17 Alongside these options, the government is carefully considering the remits of existing 
regulators that may overlap with these new requirements and whether consolidation of 
these functions, or a broader restructuring of the regulatory landscape, would reduce the 
risk of duplication and minimise burdens on businesses. It is also important to consider 
where possible future regulatory functions to tackle other online harms may sit to ensure the 
institutional structures will endure.
5.18 The government will take steps to ensure that the regulator can command public 
confidence in its independence, impartiality, capability and effectiveness. For example, we 
will consider examples from other regulated sectors about how to ensure that any movement 
of staff between the regulator and companies in scope does not undermine the public’s 
confidence in the regulator’s independence, while also ensuring the regulator is able to attract 
staff with the right skills, knowledge and experience.
Consultation questions
Question 8: What further steps could be taken to ensure the regulator will act in a targeted 
and proportionate manner?
Question 9: What, if any, advice or support could the regulator provide to help businesses, 
particularly start-ups and SMEs, comply with the regulatory framework?
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Question 10: Should an online harms regulator be: (i) a new public body, or (ii) an existing 
public body?
Question 10a: If your answer to question 10 is (ii), which body or bodies should it be?
Powers and capabilities of the regulator
5.19 The relationship between companies and regulators is often asymmetric. In regards to 
online harms this asymmetry can only be overcome if the regulator has real expertise in the 
technologies, platforms and practices under regulation. 
5.20 The new regulator will require the capacity to understand how online technology 
and platforms operate, and collect, analyse and act upon the relevant data submitted by 
companies whose services are in scope. It will also require sufficient capacity to undertake 
research and horizon scanning to ensure the regulatory requirements keep pace with 
innovation and the emergence of new harms. 
5.21 The government intends the new regulator to quickly become cost neutral to the public 
sector. To recoup the set-up costs and ongoing running costs, the government is considering 
fees, charges or a levy on companies whose services are in scope. This could fund the full 
range of the regulator’s activity, including setting and enforcing codes of practice, preparing 
transparency reports, and any education and awareness activities by the regulator.
Consultation questions
Question 11: A new or existing regulator is intended to be cost neutral: on what basis should 
any funding contributions from industry be determined?
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6: Enforcement
Summary
 • The regulator will have a range of enforcement powers to take action against 
companies that fail to fulfil their duty of care. These will include the power to issue 
substantial fines. 
 • We are consulting on which enforcement powers the regulator should have at its 
disposal, particularly to ensure a level playing field between companies that have a 
legal presence in the UK, and those who operate entirely from overseas. 
 • In particular, we are consulting on powers that would enable the regulator to disrupt 
the business activities of a non-compliant company, measures to impose liability on 
individual members of senior management, and measures to block non-compliant 
services. 
 • Companies will continue to be liable for the presence of illegal content or activity on 
their services, subject to existing protections.
6.1 The regulator will have a suite of powers to take effective enforcement action against 
companies that have breached their statutory duty of care. While the primary objective 
will be to drive rapid remedial action, when companies do not cooperate there will be 
serious consequences. 
The regulator’s enforcement powers
6.2 To be effective, the regulator must have enforcement powers that both incentivise 
companies to comply and are technically possible to implement. The regulator will use these 
powers in a proportionate manner, taking the impact on the economy into account. These 
powers must also be designed and used in a way that creates a level playing field, so that 
companies with a presence in the UK are not disproportionately penalised.
6.3 The potential sanctions for non-compliance need to:
 • Incentivise companies to fulfil their obligations quickly and effectively.
 • Apply effectively across different types of online companies, which vary 
enormously in size and revenue and may be based overseas.
 • Be proportionate to potential or actual damage caused and the size and revenue 
of the company.
6.4 There are a number of enforcement powers that will be an essential part of the new 
regulator’s toolkit. These powers have been well tested in numerous other regulatory regimes. 
These core powers will include:
 • Issuing civil fines for proven failures in clearly defined circumstances. Civil fines can 
be tied into metrics such as annual turnover, volume of illegal material, volume of 
views of illegal material, and time taken to respond to the regulator.
 • Serving a notice to a company that is alleged to have breached standards, and 
setting a timeframe to respond with an action plan to rectify the issue.
 • Requiring additional information from the company regarding the alleged breach.
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 • Publishing public notices about the proven failure of the company to comply with 
standards.
6.5 However, because of the particularly serious nature of some of the harms in scope, 
the global nature of many online services and the weak economic incentives for companies 
to change their behaviour, we think it is likely the regulator will need additional powers at its 
disposal. These measures will be more contentious because of either challenges around their 
technical feasibility or the potential impact on companies and the wider economy. We are 
therefore consulting on these options alongside this White Paper:
 • Disruption of business activities. In the event of extremely serious breaches, such 
as a company failing to take action to stop terrorist use of their services, it may be 
appropriate to force third party companies to withdraw any service they provide 
that directly or indirectly facilitates access to the services of the first company, such 
as search results, app stores, or links on social media posts. These measures 
would need to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 • ISP blocking. Internet Service Provider (ISP) blocking of non-compliant websites 
or apps – essentially blocking companies’ platforms from being accessible in the 
UK – could be an enforcement option of last resort. This option would only be 
considered where a company has committed serious, repeated and egregious 
violations of the outcome requirements for illegal harms, failing to maintain basic 
standards after repeated warnings and notices of improvement. Deploying such 
an option would be a decision for the independent regulator alone. While we 
recognise that this would have technical limitations, it could have sufficient impact 
to act as a powerful deterrent. The British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) 
will have this power to address non-compliance when the requirements for age 
verification on online pornography sites come into force. We are exploring a range 
of options in this space, from a requirement on ISPs to block websites or apps 
following notification by the regulator, through to the regulator issuing a list of 
companies that have committed serious, repeated and egregious violations, which 
ISPs could choose to block on a voluntary basis. 
 • Senior management liability. We are exploring possible options to create new 
liability for individual senior managers. This would mean certain individuals would 
be held personally accountable in the event of a major breach of the statutory duty 
of care. This could involve personal liability for civil fines, or could even extend to 
criminal liability. In financial services, the introduction of the Senior Managers & 
Certification Regime has driven a culture change in risk management in the sector. 
Another recent example of government action is establishing corporate offences 
of failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion. Recent changes to the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations (PECR) provide powers to 
assign liability to a specific person or position within an organisation. However, 
this is as yet largely untested. There are a range of options for how this could be 
applied to companies in scope of the online harms framework, and a number of 
challenges, such as identifying which roles should be prescribed and whether this 
can be proportionate for small companies.
Consultation questions
Question 12: Should the regulator be empowered to i) disrupt business activities, or ii) 
undertake ISP blocking, or iii) implement a regime for senior management liability? What, if 
any, further powers should be available to the regulator?
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Working with law enforcement and other relevant government agencies
6.6 As previously set out, the regulator will set a spectrum of expectations for companies, 
reflecting the nature of online harms and the company concerned. The expectations placed 
on firms, as set out in codes of practice, will vary according to the category of harm. 
6.7 The codes of practice for specific illegal harms (e.g. terrorism and CSEA) will seek to set 
out expectations that keep pace with criminal behaviours and activities. They will establish 
requirements and processes, where appropriate and proportionate, for referring illegal 
content and activities to law enforcement and other relevant government agencies to aid 
investigations.
6.8 In formulating the codes of practice for other illegal harms, the regulator will be expected 
to incorporate insights from law enforcement and other relevant government agencies to 
ensure the codes are adequately addressing the threat. The regulator will also be required to 
ensure its wider actions are not detrimental to matters of national security.
Enforcement in an international context
6.9 The new regulatory regime will need to handle the global nature of both the digital 
economy and many of the companies in scope. The law will apply to companies that provide 
services to UK users. We will design the regulator’s powers to ensure that it can take action 
against companies without a legal presence in the UK, including blocking platforms from 
being accessible in the UK as a last resort. Where companies do not have a legal presence 
in the UK, close collaboration between government bodies, regulators and law enforcement 
overseas, in the EU and further afield, will be required.
6.10 We are also considering options for the regulator, in certain circumstances, to require 
companies which are based outside the UK to appoint a UK or EEA-based nominated 
representative. This is similar to the concept of nominated representatives within the EU’s 
GDPR. Under GDPR, if an organisation is based outside of the EEA but serves users in 
the EEA, they are required to nominate an EEA-based representative, notionally helping to 
enforce compliance in respect of companies established outside the EEA. This may be done 
by appointing a representative under a simple service contract, and for the information to be 
easily accessible to the regulator by publishing on the company’s website. The regulator will 
also ensure that such representatives are tightly linked to their own genuine knowledge and 
ability to control the situation. However, under GDPR, the extent of compliance by companies 
based outside the EEA is still relatively untested – last year, the ICO launched the first extra-
EEA enforcement case under the GDPR against AggregateIQ Data Services Ltd (AIQ) based 
in Canada. The regulator will take a company’s failure to comply with such a requirement into 
consideration when making decisions about appropriate enforcement action. 
6.11 It is vital that the regulator takes an international approach. Where similar regulators 
and legal systems are in place in other countries, the regulator will lead engagement with 
its international counterparts. Having these relationships will support the UK’s ability to put 
pressure on companies whose primary base is overseas.
6.12 As part of our global strategy for tackling online harms, the government will seek to 
work with international partners to build consensus and identify common approaches to keep 
citizens safe online.
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Appeals
6.13 Companies and others must have confidence that the regulator is acting fairly and 
within its powers. They will have the ability to seek judicial review of the regulator’s actions 
and decisions through the High Court. We will also seek views through the consultation 
about whether there should be another statutory mechanism of review, which would allow the 
use of a tribunal other than the High Court, and what bar should be set for appeals through 
this route. 
Consultation questions
Question 13: Should the regulator have the power to require a company based outside 
the UK and EEA to appoint a nominated representative in the UK or EEA in certain 
circumstances?
Question 14: In addition to judicial review, should there be a statutory mechanism for 
companies to appeal against a decision of the regulator, as exists in relation to Ofcom under 
sections 192-196 of the Communications Act 2003? 
Question 14a: If your answer to question 14 is ‘yes’, in what circumstances should 
companies be able to use this statutory mechanism?
Question 14b: If your answer to question 14 is ‘yes’, should the appeal be decided on 
the basis of the principles that would be applied on an application for judicial review 
or on the merits of the case?
Current liability for illegal content
6.14 Under the current liability regime, which is derived from the EU’s e-Commerce Directive, 
platforms are protected from legal liability for any illegal content they ‘host’ (rather than create) 
until they have either actual knowledge of it or are aware of facts or circumstances from which 
it would have been apparent that it was unlawful, and have failed to act ‘expeditiously’ to 
remove or disable access to it. In other words, they are not liable for a piece of user-generated 
illegal content until they have received a notification of its existence, or if their technology 
has identified such content, and have subsequently failed to remove it from their services in 
good time. 
6.15 In 2018, the Prime Minister announced the government’s intention to look at how 
existing frameworks and definitions can be made to work better, with a view to ensuring 
companies take greater responsibility for removal of illegal content on their services. The 
Prime Minister noted that applying ‘publisher’ levels of liability to companies would not be 
proportionate; such an approach would force companies to check every piece of content 
before upload to ensure it was legal, with implications for freedom of expression, and it would 
be difficult to reconcile with platforms hosting large amounts of user generated content.
6.16 Our review found that, while it is important to ensure that companies have the right level 
of liability for illegal content, this is not the most effective mechanism for driving behavioural 
change by companies. The existing liability regime only forces companies to take action 
against illegal content once they have been notified of its existence. It therefore does not 
provide a mechanism to ensure proactive action to identify and remove content. In addition, 
even if reforms to the liability regime successfully addressed the problem of illegal content, 
they would not address the full range of harmful activity or harmful behaviour in scope. More 
fundamentally, the focus on liability for the presence of illegal content does not incentivise the 
systemic improvements in governance and risk management processes that we think are 
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necessary. We concluded that standalone changes to the liability regime would be insufficient. 
Instead, the new regulatory framework takes a more thorough approach. It will increase the 
responsibility that services have in relation to online harms, in line with the existing law that 
enables platforms to operate. In particular, companies will be required to ensure that they 
have effective and proportionate processes and governance in place to reduce the risk of 
illegal and harmful activity on their platforms, as well as to take appropriate and proportionate 
action when issues arise. The new regulatory regime will also ensure effective oversight of 
the take-down of illegal content, and will introduce specific monitoring requirements for tightly 
defined categories of illegal content. 
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7. Fulfilling the duty of care 
Summary
 • Ahead of the implementation of the new regulatory framework, we will encourage 
companies to take early action to address online harms. 
 • To assist this, the White Paper sets out high-level expectations of companies, 
including some specific expectations in relation to certain harms. We expect the 
regulator to reflect these in future codes of practice.
7.1 While it will be for the new regulator to produce codes of practice when it becomes 
operational, the government expects companies to take action now to tackle harmful content 
or activity on their services. For those harms where there is a risk to national security or to the 
physical safety of children, the government will publish interim codes of practice. 
7.2 To support early action from companies, and to guide the initial priorities of the regulator, 
we have set out high-level expectations of companies below. Some of these apply to all 
harms in scope, and others apply to specific issues where a tailored response is more 
appropriate. 
7.3 Given the range of services in scope of the regulatory framework, some of the 
expectations below may not be applicable to every company. However, each company in 
scope will be required to build an understanding of the risk associated with its service(s) and 
take reasonable steps to guard against the risk of harm in order to fulfil its duty of care.
The duty of care
7.4 As indication of their compliance with their overarching duty of care to keep users safe, 
we envisage that, where relevant, companies in scope will: 
 • Ensure their relevant terms and conditions meet standards set by the regulator and 
reflect the codes of practice as appropriate.
 • Enforce their own relevant terms and conditions effectively and consistently.
 • Prevent known terrorist or CSEA content being made available to users. 
 • Take prompt, transparent and effective action following user reporting.
 • Support law enforcement investigations to bring criminals who break the law online 
to justice.
 • Direct users who have suffered harm to support.
 • Regularly review their efforts in tackling harm and adapt their internal processes to 
drive continuous improvement.
7.5 To help achieve these outcomes, we expect the regulator to develop codes of practice 
that set out: 
 • Steps to ensure products and services are safe by design. 
 • Guidance about how to ensure terms of use are adequate and are understood by 
users when they sign up to use the service.
 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes and processes for moderating 
content and activity are transparent and effective. 
 • Steps to ensure harmful content or activity is dealt with rapidly.
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 • Processes that allow users to appeal the removal of content or other responses, in 
order to protect users’ rights online. 
 • Steps to ensure that users who have experienced harm are directed to, and 
receive, adequate support.
 • Steps to monitor, evaluate and improve the effectiveness of their processes.
7.6 The rest of this chapter sets out more specific outcomes for harms in scope, as well as 
further examples of how companies will be expected to fulfil their duty of care.
CSEA
7.7 CSEA online poses a severe threat to the physical safety and emotional wellbeing of 
children. Companies will be required to take stringent action – proactive and reactive – to 
monitor and address the growing and evolving threat and to tackle all manifestations of CSEA 
activity, including bearing down on the proliferation of imagery and taking necessary steps to 
target grooming and live streaming. 
7.8 We will also expect the regulator to set expectations around imagery that may not be 
visibly illegal, but linked to CSEA, for example, a series of images, some of which were taken 
prior to or after the act of abuse itself. We are continuing to work with partners to understand 
the impact of this abusive content on victims.
7.9 Existing legal requirements and voluntary industry initiatives are set out earlier in 
this White Paper. 
CSEA: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.10 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are: 
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to proactively prevent new and 
known CSEA content, and links to such material, being made available to users.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to proactively identify and act upon 
CSEA activity such as grooming.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to proactively identify and act upon 
CSEA activity alongside, or within, live streams.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to proactively identify accounts 
showing indicators of CSEA activity and ensure children are protected from them, 
including disabling accounts and informing law enforcement where appropriate.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to prevent searches linking to 
CSEA activity and content, including automatic suggestions for CSEA content not 
being made and users being directed towards alternative sources of information 
or support.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to ensure services are safe by 
design.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to provide effective systems for child 
users, and their parents or carers, to report, remove and prevent further circulation 
of images of themselves which may fall below the illegal threshold, but which leave 
them vulnerable to abuse.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to implement effective measures 
to identify which users are children, and adopt enhanced safety measures for 
these users.
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 • The reasonable steps companies should take to promptly inform law enforcement 
where there is information about a CSEA offence, including provision of sufficient 
identifying information about victims and perpetrators.
 • Steps companies should take to continually review their efforts in tackling CSEA, to 
adapt their internal processes and technology, and to continue to keep sufficiently 
up to date with the threat landscape; ensuring that their identification and response 
continually improves.
 • Guidance on the CSEA content and activity companies should proactively prevent, 
identify and act upon, which will help inform the design and implementation of 
technological tools. 
 • Thresholds for the types of content companies should preserve following removal, 
for how long they should keep it and when/with whom such information should 
proactively be shared.
 • Steps to ensure that users who are affected by CSEA content and activity are 
directed to, and are able to access, adequate support.
Terrorist use of the internet
7.11 Our aim is to ensure there is no safe space online for terrorists to operate, and to 
prevent the dissemination of terrorist content online. Such material can have significant real-
world ramifications and poses a severe threat to national security. Given this, the regulator 
will require companies to take robust action to tackle terrorist content and activity on their 
services, and ideally prevent this content from reaching users in the first place.
7.12 We set out some of the existing measures to tackle terrorist use of the internet in 
Part 1. The establishment of the GIFCT and voluntary cooperation between the government 
and the industry has led to the positive creation and adoption of automated technologies by 
the biggest companies to proactively detect and remove terrorist content. This is essential 
if the threat from terrorists is to be prevented. It is also essential that smaller companies 
receive sufficient support to successfully prevent their platforms from being exploited, 
and that all relevant platforms support the role of law enforcement and other relevant 
government agencies. 
Preventing terrorist use of the internet: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.13 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are:
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to prevent new and known terrorist 
content, and links to content, being made available to users. This should include 
guidance on proactive use of technological tools, where appropriate, to identify, 
flag, block or remove terrorist content.
 • Guidance on the content and/or activity companies should proactively prevent 
from being made available to users, which will help inform the design of 
technological tools.
 • Clarification as to what constitutes an expedient timeframe for the removal of 
terrorist content where either it is not known that it is terrorist content at the point 
of upload, or it is not possible to prevent it from being made available to users.
 • Guidance about the requirements for how companies should inform and support 
law enforcement and other relevant government agencies’ investigations and 
prosecution of criminal offences in the UK. This will include specific guidance 
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about the content companies should preserve following removal and for how long, 
and when companies should proactively alert law enforcement and other relevant 
government agencies to this content.
 • The reasonable steps companies should undertake when dealing with accounts 
that have uploaded, engaged with or disseminated terrorist content, including 
disabling accounts.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take to identify and act upon terrorist 
activity or content, including within live streams.
 • The reasonable steps we expect services to take to prevent searches which lead 
to terrorist activity and/or content, including automatic suggestions for terrorist 
content not being made and users being directed towards alternative sources of 
information or support.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure that services are safe by design.
 • Steps companies should take to continually review their efforts in tackling terrorist 
material, to adapt their internal processes and technology, and to continue to keep 
sufficiently up to date with the threat landscape; ensuring that their identification 
and response continually improves.
Serious violence
7.14 Violent content ranges from content which directly depicts or incites acts of violence, 
through to content which is violent with additional contextual understanding or which is 
harmful to users through the glamorisation of weapons and gang life. 
Serious violence: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.15 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are:
 • Guidance to companies to outline what activity and material constitutes violent 
or violence related content, including that which is explicitly criminal and how to 
report it.
 • Guidance on the content and/or activity companies should proactively identify, to 
either prevent it being made publicly available or prevent further sharing and to 
ensure that users will not receive recommendations to violent or violence related 
content.
 • Clarification as to what constitutes an expedient timeframe for the referral and 
removal of content when it is either proactively identified or referred.
 • Guidance about the requirements for how companies should inform and support 
law enforcement and other relevant government agencies’ investigations and 
prosecution of criminal offences in the UK. This should include specific guidance 
about the content companies should preserve following removal and for how long, 
and when companies should proactively alert law enforcement and other relevant 
government agencies to this content.
 • The reasonable steps companies should take when dealing with accounts that 
have uploaded, engaged with or disseminated violent or violence related content, 
including disabling accounts.
 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes are fit for purpose to tackle this harm 
and are clear, visible and easy to use. Users should receive clear explanations of 
decisions taken.
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 • Steps to ensure that services have effective and transparent processes for 
moderating this type of content and users are kept up to date with the progress of 
their report.
 • Processes companies should have in place to ensure that users can appeal the 
removal of content or other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online.
 • Steps to ensure that users who have been exposed to violent or violence related 
material are directed to, and are able to access, adequate support.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure that services are safe by design.
 • Steps companies should take to continually review their efforts in tackling this 
content, and to continue to keep sufficiently up to date with the threat landscape, 
adapting their internal processes accordingly to ensure that their identification and 
response continually improves.
Hate crime
7.16 Hate crimes include crimes demonstrating hostility on the grounds of an individual’s 
actual or perceived race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity. In 
Action Against Hate, the government’s plan for tackling hate crime (2016), and Action Against 
Hate Two Years On (2018), jointly led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government (MHCLG) and the Home Office, the government has made clear that offending 
online is just as serious as that occurring offline and perpetrators of hateful attacks should 
be held accountable for their actions. Companies should create platforms where people – 
whatever their identity or background – can work, learn and socialise together, with shared 
rights, responsibilities and opportunities.
7.17 A number of third party organisations are providing support to users to report instances 
of hate crime. The government supports True Vision, the police hate crime reporting portal, 
which helps encourage victims of hate crime to report instances online through their website 
report-it.org.uk. In Action Against Hate Two Years On (2018), we committed to supporting the 
National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) to refresh the True Vision website.
7.18 MHCLG and the Home Office also support and engage with third party organisations 
such as the Community Security Trust, Tell MAMA and Stop Hate UK, who have Trusted 
Flagger status with social media platforms to provide greater support to users to report 
experiences of hate crime online. We support the continued close cooperation of these 
organisations with government and social media platforms.
Hate crime: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.19 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are:
 • Guidance to companies to outline what activity and material constitutes hateful 
content, including that which is a hate crime, or where not necessarily illegal, 
content that may directly or indirectly cause harm to other users – for example, in 
some cases of bullying, or offensive material.
 • Guidance on the content and/or activity companies should proactively identify, to 
either prevent it being made publicly available or prevent further sharing.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure their services are safe by design.
 • Expectations around clear and accessible guidance to users on what constitutes 
hate crime and how to report it.
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 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes are fit for purpose to tackle this harm 
and are clear, visible and easy to use. Users should receive clear explanations of 
decisions taken.
 • Steps to ensure that services have effective and transparent processes for 
moderating this type of content and users are kept up to date with the progress of 
their report.
 • Clarification as to what constitutes an expedient time frame for the removal of (or 
temporarily limiting access to) hateful content.
 • Processes companies should have in place to ensure that users can appeal the 
removal of content or other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online. 
 • Reasonable steps to take to ensure that users will not receive recommendations to 
hateful or inappropriate content.
 • Steps to ensure that users who have been exposed to hateful material are directed 
to, and are able to access, adequate support.
 • Guidance on the requirements for how companies should support law 
enforcement and other relevant bodies’ investigations where appropriate.
 • An expectation that companies will continually review their efforts in tackling 
hateful material and adapt their internal processes accordingly, to drive continuous 
improvement.
Harassment 
7.20 Being harassed online can be upsetting and frightening, and online harassment can 
amount to a criminal offence. Far too many people, from public figures to schoolchildren, have 
experienced this kind of behaviour. A poll conducted for Amnesty International found that 
21% of the women surveyed in the UK (504 women) had experienced online harassment or 
abuse, with 17% having experienced this on social media.69 There are many forms of abuse 
and some evidence suggests differences in the type of abuse experienced between men and 
women. Research suggests more women than men experience sexual forms of verbal abuse 
(21% compared to 9% of men), while more men than women experience offensive name 
calling (30% compared to 23%) and physical threats (12% compared to 8%).70 
7.21 The cumulative impact of online misogyny undermines women’s and girls’ digital 
contributions, silencing their voices and reducing their visibility. As a result of abuse or 
harassment, 67% of women in the UK experienced a feeling of apprehension when thinking 
about using the internet or social media.71 
Harassment: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.22 Companies will need to take robust action when there is evidence that users are being 
harassed or abused on their services. Companies will also need to respond quickly and 
proportionately if this activity emerges. 
69 Amnesty International (2018). Toxic Twitter – Women’s Experiences of Violence and Abuse on Twitter. Available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/03/online-violence-against-women-chapter-3/
70 Pew Research Centre (2017). Online Harassment. Available at: http://www.pewInternet.org/2017/07/11/online-
harassment-2017/
71 NewStatesman (2017). Social media and the silencing effect: why misogyny online is a human rights issue. Available 
at: https://www.newstatesman.com/2017/11/social-media-and-silencing-effect-why-misogyny-online-human-rights-
issue 
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7.23 Current measures taken by companies to tackle online harassment include: 
 • Tools to report incidents of harassment. 
 • Tools to block or stay hidden from other users.
 • Removal of content which is illegal or violates acceptable use.
7.24 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are: 
 • Steps companies should take to ensure that their services are safe by design. For 
victims of harassment, it is important that there are easy-to-use tools that allow 
them to take control over the privacy and visibility of their account and who is able 
to contact them.
 • Tools companies can provide to help users experiencing harassment, such as the 
ability to mute, block or stay hidden from other users, and to manage and control 
access to particular services and content.
 • Guidance about how to ensure it is easy for users to understand these tools, and 
the company’s terms of use in relation to this harm, when they sign up to use 
the service.
 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes are fit for purpose to tackle this 
harm, such as the ability to report a high volume of messages in bulk to reduce the 
burden on victims suffering from a campaign of harassment, and a prompt to use 
the tools to block the other user while the report is being investigated.
 • Services have effective and transparent processes for moderating this type of 
content and activity. Users are kept up to date with the progress of their report. 
 • Steps companies should take to ensure harms are dealt with rapidly, such as 
removing content which is illegal, blocking users responsible for illegal activity and, 
where appropriate, supporting law enforcement efforts.
 • Processes companies should have in place to ensure that users can appeal the 
removal of content or other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online. 
 • Steps to prevent banned users creating new accounts to continue the harassment.
 • Steps to limit anonymised users abusing their services, including harassing others.
 • Steps to ensure that users who have experienced harassment are directed to, and 
are able to access, adequate support.
Disinformation
7.25 When the internet is deliberately used to spread false or misleading information, it 
can harm us in many different ways, encouraging us to make decisions that could damage 
our health, undermining our respect and tolerance for each other and confusing our 
understanding of what is happening in the wider world. It can also damage our trust in our 
democratic institutions, including Parliament.
7.26 Current initiatives that companies are exploring to tackle the spread of 
disinformation include: 
 • Terms of service that require users not to misrepresent their identity on social 
media in order to disseminate or amplify disinformation.
 • Tools to report suspicious, fake or spam accounts on some social media 
platforms.
 • Use of automated AI techniques to detect and remove fake and spam accounts.
 • Partnerships between platforms and independent fact-checking services.
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 • Tools to provide users with more context about the content they view on 
platforms, including enhanced transparency about the origins of political and 
electoral adverts. 
Disinformation: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.27 Companies will need to take proportionate and proactive measures to help users 
understand the nature and reliability of the information they are receiving, to minimise 
the spread of misleading and harmful disinformation and to increase the accessibility of 
trustworthy and varied news content.
7.28 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are:
 • The steps companies should take in their terms of service to make clear what 
constitutes disinformation, the expectations they have of users, and the penalties 
for violating those terms of service.
 • Steps that companies should take in relation to users who deliberately 
misrepresent their identity to spread and strengthen disinformation.
 • Making content which has been disputed by reputable fact-checking services less 
visible to users.
 • Using fact-checking services, particularly during election periods.
 • Promoting authoritative news sources.
 • Promoting diverse news content, countering the ‘echo chamber’ in which people 
are only exposed to information which reinforces their existing views.
 • Ensuring that it is clear to users when they are dealing with automated accounts, 
and that automated dissemination of content is not abused.
 • Improving the transparency of political advertising, helping meet any requirements 
in electoral law.
 • Reporting processes which companies should put in place to ensure that users 
can easily flag content that they suspect or know to be false, and which enable 
users to understand what actions have been taken and why.
 • Processes for publishing data that will enable the public to assess the overall 
effectiveness of the actions companies are taking, and for supporting research into 
the nature of online disinformation activity.
 • Steps that services should take to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their 
processes for tackling disinformation and adapt processes accordingly.
7.29 Maintaining a news environment where accurate content can prevail and high 
quality news has a sustainable future is vital to healthy social and democratic engagement, 
and key to long-term success in tackling disinformation. In March 2018, the government 
commissioned Dame Frances Cairncross to conduct her independent review into the 
sustainability of high quality journalism. In her detailed and considered report (published 
in February 2019), Dame Frances proposed that a ‘news quality obligation’ be imposed 
upon social media companies, which would require these companies to improve how their 
users understand the origin of a news article and the trustworthiness of its source. This 
recommendation is very much in line with our aim to strengthen the online environment 
and relates closely to our expectations for social media companies (as set out above). The 
government is now considering this proposal and Dame Frances’ other recommendations, 
and we will look to take action where appropriate.
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7.30 Companies will be required to ensure that algorithms selecting content do not skew 
towards extreme and unreliable material in the pursuit of sustained user engagement. 
7.31 Importantly, the code of practice that addresses disinformation will ensure the focus 
is on protecting users from harm, not judging what is true or not. There will be difficult 
judgement calls associated with this. The government and the future regulator will engage 
extensively with civil society, industry and other groups to ensure action is as effective as 
possible, and does not detract from freedom of speech online.
Encouragement of self-harm and suicide 
7.32 Users should be able to talk online about sensitive topics such as suicide and 
self-harm, but more needs to be done to protect vulnerable users and tackle content and 
behaviour which encourages suicide and self-harm.72
7.33 Current measures to tackle the encouragement of self-harm and suicide include:
 • Arrangements between individual companies and charities to improve the 
identification and removal of this content when it is reported.
 • Services that signpost help and promote supportive content to their users.
Encouragement of self-harm and suicide: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.34 Companies will be required to take robust action to address harmful suicidal and self-
harm content that provides graphic details of suicide methods and self-harming, including 
encouragement of self-harm and suicide. Services must also respond quickly to identify and 
remove content which is illegal or violates terms of use, and act swiftly and proportionately 
when this content is reported to them by users.
7.35 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are:
 • Steps to ensure that vulnerable users and users who actively search for or have 
been exposed to this content, including content that encourages eating disorders, 
are directed to, and able to access, adequate support.
 • Ensuring that companies work with experts in suicide prevention to ensure that 
their policies and practices are designed to protect the most vulnerable (and to 
ensure that moderators receive appropriate training).
 • Steps companies should take to ensure that their services are safe by design, 
including tools to help users avoid material or behaviour which encourages suicide 
or self-harm, and measures to block content and block, mute and stay hidden 
from other users.
 • Guidance about how to ensure it is easy for users to understand these tools, and 
the company’s terms of use in relation to these harms, when they sign up to use 
the service.
 • Processes to stop algorithms promoting self-harm or suicide content to users.
 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes and processes for moderating 
content and activity are transparent and effective at tackling the encouragement of 
self-harm and suicide and measures to ensure that users are kept up to date with 
the progress of their report. 
72 Encouraging and assisting suicide is a criminal offence. Self-harm is not a criminal offence.
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 • Steps services should take to ensure they engage sufficiently with civil society 
groups and law enforcement, so that moderators are educated about what 
constitutes self-harm or suicide encouragement and how it can be prevented 
and tackled.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure harm is tackled rapidly, such as removing 
content which is illegal or violates acceptable use, and blocking users responsible 
for activity which violates terms and conditions, as well as steps that services can 
take to ensure that these measures are conducted sensitively.
 • Processes companies should have in place to ensure that users can appeal the 
removal of content or other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online. 
 • Steps to prevent banned users creating new accounts to continue to encourage 
suicide or self-harm.
Online abuse of public figures: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.36 As set out in Box 14, those involved in public life in the UK experience regular and 
sustained abuse online, which goes beyond free speech and impedes individuals’ rights to 
participate. As well as being upsetting and frightening for the individual involved, this abuse 
corrodes our democratic values and dissuades good people from entering public life. 
7.37 The steps we expect the regulator to include in codes of practice relating to all forms 
of abusive behaviour online, including harassment and cyber-bullying, will also help address 
this problem, and include:
 • Steps companies should take to ensure that their services are safe by design. For 
all users, including public figures, it is important that there are easy-to-use tools 
that allow them to take control over the privacy and visibility of their account and 
who is able to contact them. 
 • Tools companies can provide to help users experiencing abuse, such as the ability 
to mute, block or stay hidden from other users, and to manage and control access 
to particular services and content. 
 • Clear guidance in the company’s terms of use on the type of activity which will be 
treated as unacceptable and the actions the company will take in response to such 
activity, which is available to users when they sign up to use the service.
 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes are fit for purpose to tackle this 
harm, such as the ability to report a high volume of messages in bulk to reduce the 
burden on victims suffering from a campaign of online abuse, and a prompt to use 
the tools to block the other user while the report is being investigated.
 • Services have effective and transparent processes for moderating this type of 
content and activity. Users are kept up to date with the progress of their report.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure harms are dealt with rapidly, such as 
removing content which is illegal, blocking users responsible for illegal activity, 
enforcing and upholding the service’s relevant terms and conditions and, where 
appropriate, supporting law enforcement efforts.
 • Processes companies should have in place to ensure that users can appeal the 
removal of content or other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online.
 • Steps companies should take to limit anonymised users using their services to 
abuse others.
 • Steps to prevent banned users creating new accounts to continue the abuse.
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 • Steps to ensure that users who are affected by abusive comments and activity are 
directed to, and are able to access, adequate support.
Interference with legal proceedings
7.38 Activity that can impede a person’s right to a fair trial, or that breaches a person’s legal 
right to anonymity, such as communications that may amount to a breach of a court order or 
a statutory prohibition, or that may prejudice a jury, may amount to contempt of court or be a 
criminal offence.
7.39 Current measures to tackle this problem include:
 • Action taken by law enforcement and the criminal justice system in relation to 
publishing information online and exposing the identity of protected individuals 
which could jeopardise legal proceedings.
 • The bringing of contempt proceedings against those who create a substantial risk 
of serious prejudice. 
7.40 Furthermore, in its Response to the Call for Evidence on the Impact of Social Media on 
the Administration of Justice,73 the Attorney General’s Office has:
 • Set out plans to promote the safe use of social media as part of a public legal 
education campaign, which will include a GOV.UK webpage. 
 • Highlighted that the Judicial Office are working to develop clear, accessible, and 
comprehensive guidance on contempt.
 • Agreed points of contact with a number of social media companies so that relevant 
material can be flagged and, if necessary, removed.
 • Set out plans to work with cross-government partners to improve the enforcement 
of the law on anonymity online.
7.41 Companies will be required to take robust action when there is evidence that a risk of 
interference with criminal trials or other legal proceedings is present. Companies will also be 
required to respond quickly and proportionately where new risks emerge.
Interference with legal proceedings: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.42 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are: 
 • Tools companies can provide to help users report possible interference with legal 
proceedings, such as the ability to report anonymously.
 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes and processes for moderating 
content and activity are transparent and effective at tackling interference with legal 
proceedings and measures, to ensure that users are kept up to date with the 
progress of their report.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure harms are dealt with rapidly, to ensure that 
posts that are in contempt of court or that breach anonymity orders are removed 
as soon as possible once they have been reported. User guidance setting this out 
should be incorporated into the company’s terms and conditions to ensure clarity 
when users sign up to use the service.
73 Attorney General’s Office (2019). Response to Call for Evidence on the Impact of Social Media on the Administration 
of Justice. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/response-to-call-for-evidence-on-the-impact-of-
social-media-on-the-administration-of-justice
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 • Processes companies should have in place to ensure that users can appeal the 
removal of content or other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online.
 • Steps to prevent banned users creating new accounts to continue or repeat the 
interference with legal proceedings.
Cyberbullying
7.43 Cyberbullying, including trolling, is unacceptable. Being bullied online can be a deeply 
upsetting experience, particularly for children or other vulnerable users. 
7.44 Current measures to tackle cyberbullying and trolling include:
 • Provision of information and resources on bullying and other online safety issues.
 • Tools to report incidents of bullying.
 • Tools to block or stay hidden from other users.
 • Removal of content which violates acceptable use.
Cyberbullying: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.45 The regulator will set out steps that should be taken to tackle cyberbullying, such as 
ensuring that those who have suffered from this harm are directed to, and are able to access, 
adequate support. 
7.46 In the meantime, the statutory Social Media Code of Practice, published alongside this 
White Paper in line with the DCMS Secretary of State’s duty under section 103 of the Digital 
Economy Act 2017, sets out non-binding principles that companies should adhere to in order 
to tackle bullying, insulting, intimidating and humiliating conduct online. It also explains good 
practice ways to implement these principles. We expect all social media companies to adhere 
to this code of practice, ahead of the new regulatory requirements. We expect the regulator to 
consider this guidance when drawing up future codes of practice. 
7.47 These principles are:
 • Social media providers should maintain a clear and accessible reporting process 
to enable individuals to notify social media providers of harmful conduct.
 • Social media providers should maintain efficient processes for dealing with 
notifications from users about harmful conduct.
 • Social media providers should have clear and accessible information about 
reporting processes in their terms and conditions.
 • Social media providers should give clear information to the public about action they 
take against harmful conduct. 
Children accessing inappropriate content
7.48 Some online content that is lawful and appropriate for adults, such as dating apps 
or pornography, may cause significant harm to children who either access it intentionally 
or stumble across it. The Chief Medical Officers for England, Wales and Scotland recently 
advocated a precautionary approach to protecting children from harmful content because of 
its possible impact on their mental health or development. 
7.49 Current measures to tackle children accessing inappropriate content include:
 • Forthcoming compulsory age verification for commercial online pornography sites.
 • Family friendly filters to filter inappropriate material.
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 • Content warnings for inappropriate content.
7.50 The designated classification authorities for offline content, the BBFC and the Video 
Standards Council (VSC), have clear standards based on their evaluation of likely harm and 
use these to allocate BBFC or PEGI age suitability ratings to inform viewing decisions and 
protect children and vulnerable adults. These age ratings are applied voluntarily to online 
content by some publishers and platforms. The new regulatory framework is not intended to 
impact the existing classification of offline and online content by BBFC and VSC.
Children accessing inappropriate content: Fulfilling the duty of care
7.51 Companies will be required to take robust action when there is evidence that children 
are accessing inappropriate content. Companies will also be required to respond quickly and 
proportionately where new risks emerge.
7.52 Some of the areas we expect the regulator to include in a code of practice are: 
 • Steps companies should take to ensure that their services are safe by design. This 
could include the provision of accounts with different settings for children.
 • Terms of service should make clear what behaviour and activity is tolerated on 
the service and the measures that are in place to prevent children accessing 
inappropriate content and they should be easy for children and parents 
to understand.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure children are unable to access 
inappropriate content, including guidance on age verification, content warnings and 
measures to filter and block inappropriate content.
 • Measures to ensure that reporting processes are fit for purpose to tackle this 
harm and are clear, visible and easy for children and parents to understand. Users 
should receive clear explanations of decisions taken. 
 • Services have effective and transparent processes for moderating this type of 
content and activity. Users are kept up to date with the progress of their report.
 • Steps companies should take to ensure harms are rapidly dealt with, such as 
removing content which violates terms of service.
 • Processes services should have in place to ensure that users can appeal the 
removal of content or other responses, in order to protect users’ rights online.
 • Steps to prevent banned users creating new accounts in order to continue to make 
inappropriate content which violates terms of service.
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PART 4: Technology, education 
and awareness
8: Technology as part of the solution
Summary
 • Companies should invest in the development of safety technologies to reduce the 
burden on users to stay safe online. 
 • In November 2018, the Home Secretary co-hosted a hackathon with five major 
technology companies to develop a new tool to identify online grooming, to be 
licensed for free to other companies, but more of these innovative and collaborative 
efforts are needed.
 • The government and the new regulator will work with leading industry bodies and 
other regulators to support innovation and growth in this area and encourage the 
adoption of safety technologies. 
 • The government will also work with the industry and civil society to develop a safety 
by design framework, linking up with existing legal obligations around data protection 
by design and secure by design principles, to make it easier for start-ups and 
small businesses to embed safety during the development or update of products 
and services. 
8.1 Technology can play a crucial role in keeping users safe online. By designing safer and 
more secure online products and services, the tech sector can equip all companies and 
users with better tools to tackle online harms. We want the UK to be a world-leader in the 
development of online safety technology and to ensure companies of all sizes have access to, 
and adopt, innovative solutions to improve the safety of their users. 
Existing initiatives 
8.2 In the UK, a dynamic and innovative market has sprung up around online safety, 
developing tools for business to protect their users from harms. For example:
 • SuperAwesome, one of the fastest-growing technology SMEs in the UK, provides 
tools and technology that protect the digital privacy of children.
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 • Crisp, an SME with complex AI-based tools to support moderation and monitoring 
of content, helps hundreds of companies worldwide run safer platforms – every 
month its systems assess billions of pieces of content for illegal or harmful 
content, and help to identify repeat offenders who are continually posting 
inappropriate content. 
 • Yoti, a digital identity provider, is partnering with the Yubo social network to 
use machine learning age estimation to detect whether website users are in 
the right age band for their platform – an important step in helping safeguard 
children online. 
8.3 The government is supporting the development of this emerging safety tech ecosystem 
in the UK: 
 • The Home Office worked with Faculty (formerly ASI Data Science) to develop 
technology that can identify the official Daesh propaganda videos that are a key 
part of the terrorist groups efforts to radicalise, recruit and inspire acts of terrorism 
in the UK and abroad. 
 • The government launched a challenge fund, through the GovTech Catalyst 
scheme, to develop technology that can automate the detection of terrorist still 
imagery. Five UK companies have been awarded £50,000 to work on proposals, 
and this year the leading proposals will receive up to £500,000 to develop and test 
a prototype.
 • The government is investing £300,000 to fund up to five innovative projects that 
use new technologies to disrupt live online CSEA.
 • Through National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Accelerator programmes, 
the government is ensuring the rapid development of solutions to cyber 
security challenges such as authentication, mobile device security and identity 
management, that work to reduce online harms through increasing the security of 
users’ online environments, giving them more control over their interactions and 
making access harder for those who seek to use technology to facilitate abuse.
Online safety apps: BBC Own It Box 27
BBC Own It, launching later in 2019, is a new wellbeing app aimed at children aged 8-13 
receiving their first smartphone. The app is part of the BBC’s commitment to supporting 
young people in today’s changing media environment and follows the successful launch 
of the Own It website in 2018. 
The app combines state-of-the-art machine-learning technology to track children’s 
activity on their smartphone with the ability for children to self-report their emotional state. 
It uses this information to deliver tailored content and interventions to help children stay 
happy and healthy online, offering friendly and supportive nudges when their behaviour 
strays outside the norm. Users can access the app when they’re looking for help but it 
will always be on-hand to give instant, on-screen advice and support when they need it, 
via a specially-developed keyboard. Features include:
 • Reminding them to think twice before sharing personal details like mobile numbers on 
social media.
 • Helping them understand how messages could be perceived by others, before they 
hit send.
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 • Tracking their mood over time and offering guidance on how to improve the situation 
if needed.
 • Information on topics like using phones late at night and the impact on their wellbeing.
The app features specially commissioned content from across the BBC. It provides useful 
material and resources to help young people get the most out of their time online, and 
build healthy online behaviours and habits. The app will help young people and parents 
have more constructive conversations about their experiences online, but won’t provide 
reports or feedback to parents and no data will leave their device.
Tackling online grooming: industry hackathon Box 28
The challenge of online grooming of children for exploitation and abuse crosses borders 
and platforms. Addressing it requires collaboration between companies to develop 
innovative solutions that can be shared in a joint effort to eradicate grooming from 
digital space.
 • In November 2018, the Home Secretary co-hosted a ‘hackathon’ event in the US with 
Microsoft and a range of other tech companies, where they worked to develop a new 
AI product to detect online grooming of children. Hackathon participants analysed 
tens of thousands of conversations to understand patterns used by predators. This 
enabled engineers to develop technology to automatically and accurately detect 
these patterns. 
 • During 2019, this anti-grooming tool will be licensed free of charge to smaller and 
medium-sized technology companies worldwide – and government will work closely 
with industry to help ensure high rates of adoption.
Boosting innovation in safety technology 
8.4 The online safety ecosystem incorporates a number of distinct markets including 
third party technical solutions, human moderation services, hashing and finger-printing 
technologies and AI/machine learning solutions for the automated detection of harmful 
content. The government will work with the tech sector to make the UK a world-leader in 
innovative safety solutions across these markets.
8.5 The new regulator will use its unique position in the market to drive development of new 
technologies and encourage the sharing of tools and best practice amongst companies.
8.6 In the meantime, the government will work with partners across industry, academia and 
civil society to support innovation in safety technologies. In particular, we will:
 • Assess the capability and potential of the UK online safety sector.
 • Work with Tech Nation, TechUK and other industry partners to help companies 
more effectively detect and respond to online harms by promoting the rapid 
innovation, development and scale-up of safety products.
 • Work with UKRI to support research into understanding online harms and the 
development of innovative technological solutions that meet the challenge of 
protecting citizens online. 
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 • Support the development of scalable privacy-enhancing technologies to allow 
companies to access training data to develop AI solutions, without compromising 
highly sensitive or illegal datasets. 
8.7 We are bringing in external expertise to help government provide further direction. This 
includes the Digital Charter Fellowship programme, which DCMS is running in partnership 
with the Alan Turing Institute (Turing). Fellows will develop – with the lead government 
departments – policy responses to key challenges posed by the internet and new 
technologies. This will include experimenting with a range of processes and tools, including 
convening small groups of experts (from industry, academia and government) to work 
intensively on the issue. Manipulation, disinformation and online safety are key areas of focus 
for the first phase of the Fellowship programme. 
8.8 We will work further with research organisations to understand how AI can best be used 
to detect, measure and counter online harms, while ensuring its deployment remains safe 
and ethical. 
Online safety initiatives: Analysing and countering hate speech:   Box 29 
The role of AI
Hateful content on digital platforms is a growing problem in the UK, inflicting harm on 
victims, creating and exacerbating social divisions, and eroding trust in the host platforms.
 • However, despite the harm caused by hate content, we lack adequate data on its 
scale and scope, limiting our ability to develop more sophisticated and effective 
responses. Part of the challenge is that online hate takes many forms and is directed 
against many different targets, including ethnic minorities and women.
 • A new project led by Turing is setting out to address this issue. The ‘Hate Speech: 
Measures and Counter-measures’ project will use a mix of natural language 
processing techniques and qualitative analyses to create tools which identify and 
categorise different strengths and types of online hate speech.
 • The aim is to make these tools open and accessible to the public, and ultimately for 
them to be used to support a broad range of commercial and public sector providers 
to detect and address harmful and undesirable content. The project also aims to 
release annotated training datasets, enabling other researchers to further build on 
their work.
 • Turing is planning work more broadly to study the influence of algorithmic systems on 
humans, as part of its initiative on safe and ethical AI.
Interventions to boost adoption and use of technologies
8.9 Many of the leading companies already use their resource and expertise to support the 
development of shared platforms and technologies that can be adopted by wider industry. 
These include Microsoft’s PhotoDNA, a shared system for detecting and responding to 
images of child sexual abuse, and Google’s Perspective API, which uses machine learning 
to flag potentially harmful or ‘toxic’ content to moderators. In November 2018, Microsoft and 
other companies came together in a ‘hackathon’ to develop anti-grooming technology, which 
will be licensed free of charge to smaller companies worldwide (Box 28).
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8.10 It is crucial that we continue to drive the adoption of safety products so that users 
receive consistent levels of protection online. To achieve this we will:
 • Work with industry to encourage the development and take-up of free or low-cost 
shared platforms for safety, such as the Home Office anti-grooming tool.
 • Fund research by Doteveryone, an independent thinktank, into barriers to the 
adoption of technologies and working practices that promote user safety and 
wellbeing, and the practical guidance and techniques needed to overcome 
these barriers.
 • Support the development by Innovate UK and BSI of a publicly available standard 
(PAS) for responsible innovation, to help companies think through and identify any 
potential issues raised by their proposed innovations.
Safety by Design
8.11 Creating a safer user experience on online products and platforms requires more 
than the use of new technology. Decisions made throughout the product development life 
cycle – around privacy and data protection, cybersecurity, moderation, reporting and support 
mechanisms for users, clarity of terms and conditions – all combine to shape the overall 
safety and security of a user’s experience. 
8.12 To prepare for the new regulatory framework, it should be as easy as possible for 
designers of products and platforms to understand what standards are expected of them, 
and to be able to incorporate existing good practices into their products from the earliest 
stages of product development to ensure that their products are safe by design. 
8.13 Box 30 provides an example of good practice safe design that aims to protect children 
online. Across the industry as a whole, however, standards remain inconsistent, and frequently 
do not prioritise users’ rights – in particular, it is commonplace for design to encourage 
addictive behaviour rather than wellbeing, or for collecting user-data to be prioritised over 
privacy. This results in an unacceptable burden on users to manage their online safety without 
sufficient support from the companies that they rely on. This is a particular concern for 
vulnerable users.
Online safety apps: Lego Life Box 30
In 2017, the LEGO Group launched a social-themed app, LEGO® Life. The ambition 
behind the app is to inspire younger children to build and share their creations in a high-
safety, high-trust environment. LEGO® Life embeds safety by design principles, as well as 
introducing children to positive elements of social platforms, such as being able to share 
moments with family and friends.
They have recently strengthened this approach by using innovative solutions, such as the 
anthropomorphic advice engine, Captain Safety. The character provides a safety tutorial 
from the beginning and becomes the child’s guide throughout the experience, delivering 
empowering safety messages at certain critical points, such as before sharing certain 
data or commenting on public posts.
8.14 To drive up standards, the government will work with industry and civil society 
to develop a Safety by Design framework to help companies incorporate online safety 
throughout the development or update of online services. This framework will set out clear 
principles and practical guidance on how to include online safety features in new applications 
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and platforms from the start, targeted at digital product teams, including designers, 
developers and user researchers. This could include guidance which highlights the need for 
providers to:
 • Make it clear to users what forms of content are acceptable, as part of the terms of 
service and throughout their journey.
 • Have effective systems for detecting and responding to illegal or harmful content, 
including the use of AI-based technology and trained moderators.
 • Make it easy for users to report problem content, and design an efficient triage 
system to deal with reports.
 • Give users control of their experience by collecting the minimum amount of 
personal data and giving them informed choices about how their personal 
information, including geolocation data, is used.
8.15 In developing the framework, we will pay special attention to the needs of start-ups and 
scale-up businesses, which can lack the capacity and expertise to ensure their products and 
services are safe by design. We expect the framework will be complementary with existing 
privacy by design and security by design standards. For example, it will reflect and signpost 
the forthcoming Age-appropriate design code (see Box 31) – and the Code of Practice for 
Consumer Internet of Things Security (Box 32). 
8.16 We anticipate that the new regulator will build on this framework and use it to inform 
its approach to issuing codes of practice and guidance to companies about how to fulfil their 
new legal duties. We envisage that this framework will support companies to take practical 
action to tackle harm and meet the high-level expectations set out in Chapter 7. 
8.17 The DfE is also planning to publish its Education Technology Strategy in the spring 
which will highlight the importance of privacy, security and safety. The strategy will include 
clarity on the guidelines that EdTech suppliers should adhere to and the guidance available for 
schools and colleges to support their procurement and use of safety technology. 
Consultation questions
Question 15: What are the greatest opportunities and barriers for (i) innovation and (ii) 
adoption of safety technologies by UK organisations, and what role should government play in 
addressing these? 
Question 16: What, if any, are the most significant areas in which organisations need practical 
guidance to build products that are safe by design?
Online safety initiatives: Age-appropriate design code:   Box 31 
Safer design standards for children
Whether playing online games, watching and sharing videos or interacting with friends via 
apps and social media, children today grow up with digital technology as a fundamental 
part of their daily lives. This can enrich their lives but it can also pose risks. To help 
guarantee a better digital future for our children, we need to have world-leading standards 
that provide proper safeguards for our children when online. 
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 • The government included provisions in the Data Protection Act 2018 to help ensure 
this is the case. These require the Information Commissioner to produce an ‘age-
appropriate design code of practice’, to provide guidance on the privacy standards 
that organisations should adopt where they are offering online services and apps that 
children are likely to access and which will process their data. 
 • These standards in the code will be backed by legally enforceable data protection 
laws, which empower the Information Commissioner to take action and impose 
tough penalties under GDPR, including enforcement orders and fines of up to 4% of 
global turnover.
 • The code will focus on the best interests of a child. It will ensure nothing is left to 
chance and that a ‘data protection by design’ approach is adopted. Companies will 
be held accountable for their actions living up to their promises on how they handle 
children’s information. 
 • The code will address the need to implement high privacy settings by default 
and use language that is clear and easy to understand for youngsters at different 
stages of their development. It will also focus on key safeguards around the 
automated profiling of children, the use of geolocation data, and the transparency of 
marketing techniques.
 • It will also address practices such as those used by sites and apps to personalise a 
child’s experience to encourage them to stay online longer, such as auto-play videos 
and the timing of social media notifications.
 • Work on developing the code is well advanced, with calls for evidence and 
commissioned research already concluded. A formal public consultation will follow in 
the coming months.
Online safety initiatives: Internet of Things: Security Code of Practice Box 32
Recent years have seen huge growth in the number of ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) products, 
consumer-facing internet connected ‘smart’ devices that people use in their homes 
such as smart appliances, personal assistants, children’s toys, web cameras and baby 
monitors. However, across the IoT, there are many instances of insecure products 
that make consumers vulnerable to cyber attacks, which can lead to physical and 
emotional harm. 
 • To combat this, in October 2018 the government published the Code of Practice for 
Consumer IoT Security. This code of practice consists of thirteen outcome-focused 
guidelines that clearly describe the steps that IoT producers need to take to ensure 
their products and services are secure by design. 
 • We believe the next stage in this work is for appropriate aspects of the code of 
practice to become legally enforceable, therefore offering consumers greater 
protection from the online harms associated with these products. We have 
commenced work to consider which aspects of regulatory change are necessary.
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 • The code of practice has also been used to create the first globally-applicable 
industry standard for IoT consumer devices, the ETSI 103 645 Technical Standard 
(ETSI TS). We will work to drive adoption of this standard, setting in place a 
harmonised technical approach that protects citizens across the world.
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9. Empowering users
Summary
 • Users want to be empowered to manage their online safety, and that of their children, 
but there is insufficient support in place and they currently feel vulnerable online. 
 • Government has taken steps to address digital literacy in the relevant areas of the 
school curriculum. 
 • The Government will develop a new online media literacy strategy, through broad 
consultation with stakeholders.
 • While companies are supporting a range of positive initiatives, there is insufficient 
transparency about the level of investment and the effectiveness of different 
interventions. The new regulator will have the power to require companies to report 
on their education and awareness raising activities.
9.1 All users, children and adults, should be empowered to understand and manage risks 
so that they can stay safe online. The government is ensuring that children get high quality 
education at school to develop their digital literacy. Adult users should act in an acceptable 
manner, challenge unacceptable behaviour when they witness it, and use tools available 
to them to manage their online experience. They have a responsibility to manage their own 
online safety, and to support children in their care. In this rapidly changing environment, it 
can take time to learn how to evaluate what is and is not risky, and to acquire the skills to 
avoid harm. 
9.2 Many companies have invested in education and awareness activities, often in 
partnership with civil society, and created tools to empower their users, such as software from 
Apple and Google that produces reports for users that help them to assess and control their 
online activity (see Box 33). While such industry initiatives are welcome, there continues to be 
a lack of transparency about their scale and effectiveness, and a real risk of duplication in the 
absence of strategic coordination. While we recognise the concerns of civil society about the 
risks of disrupting these existing positive working relationships with industry, we want to work 
with all stakeholders to ensure that there is sufficient industry investment in education and 
preventative activity, and that there is independent evaluation of its effectiveness.
9.3 The technical complexity and pace of innovation of the online world means that there 
is a constant need to improve the tools available to users so that they are able to manage 
and address risks online. A number of recent independent reports have also highlighted the 
specific need for improved digital literacy, including the DCMS Select Committee’s report into 
disinformation74 and the Cairncross report on A sustainable future for journalism.75 Children 
have also told us that they want more education about online safety, as well as more support 
from tech companies to keep them safe (see Box 34). 
74 Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2019). Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report. Available at:  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
75 The Cairncross Review (2019). A sustainable future for journalism. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/779882/021919_DCMS_Cairncross_Review_.pdf 
86  Online Harms White Paper
Online safety apps: Apple Screen Time and Google Family Link Box 33
In June 2018, Apple launched updates to its mobile operating system that help customers 
reduce interruptions and manage screen time for themselves and their families. 
These included:
 • Daily and weekly reports that inform users of the total time spent in each app, usage 
across categories of apps, how many notifications are received and how often a 
person picks up their device.
 • Tools to set specific limits on the amount of time spent in an app, and a notification 
that displays when a time limit is about to expire.
 • Settings that allow users to more closely control their notifications, including a mode 
to help people get a better night’s sleep.
 • Parents can access information about their child’s activity on their own devices 
to understand where their child spends their time and can manage and set limits 
for them.
Similarly, Google’s Family Link app allows parents to: 
 • View how long their children spend on different apps.
 • Approve or block apps their children want to download, or recommend specific apps. 
 • Set limits on screen time, and remotely lock a child’s device for a break.
Furthermore, some gaming consoles, such as Xbox One, Playstation4 and Nintendo 
Switch have tools which allow parents to control access to content and place limits on 
screen time.
Online safety initiatives: Understanding children’s needs online Box 34
The UK Council for Child Internet Safety (now the UK Council for Internet Safety) 
published the Children’s online activities, risks and safety research review in October 
2017. This included evidence that while many feel able to cope with general or random 
negative comments online, personal or targeted behaviour was more distressing and they 
were likely to seek help from friends or family, or report abuse to the relevant social media 
platform. However, when experiences are persistent and extreme, children can find it 
difficult to tell anyone, and this often makes the experience worse. 
 • Children and young people are much more likely to confide in friends than parents 
or carers about upsetting or embarrassing incidents. The review notes a range 
of reasons children and young people don’t talk to parents, including feeling 
uncomfortable talking to parents or worries that devices and internet access will be 
taken away from them.
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 • Alongside the Internet Safety Strategy Green Paper, the government worked with the 
British Computing Society (BCS), The Chartered Institute for IT to carry out a survey 
of 6,500 children and young people about online safety.76 
The survey highlighted that:
 • Two thirds of children aged 12 and under (67%) and nearly half of 13 to 18 year olds 
(46%) would welcome more education in schools about online safety.
 • Children have low expectations of social media platforms in relation to their 
privacy, safety and security online and would like to be better protected against 
abusive content.
 • Nearly half (42% of under 13s, 41% of 13 to 18 year olds) said tech companies don’t 
think about the online safety of people their age when they’re making websites 
or apps.
 • Nearly two thirds (66% of under 13s, 63% of 13 to 18 year olds) thought tech firms 
should proactively delete abusive messages before complaints are made.
Existing initiatives to empower users to stay safe online 
9.4 DfE continues to incorporate online safety into the school curriculum, to help children 
and young people understand healthy relationships online, and to improve their digital literacy 
to equip them to manage the different and escalating risks that young people face.
9.5 As part of this, DfE is making Relationships Education compulsory for all primary pupils, 
Relationships and Sex Education compulsory for all secondary pupils and Health Education 
compulsory for all pupils in all primary and secondary state-funded schools in England. The 
Department recently consulted77 on draft guidance for these subjects which includes teaching 
about respectful relationships, including online, as well as health and mental wellbeing. This 
will include: 
 • How to stay safe online.
 • Critically considering information and how people present themselves online.
 • Rights and responsibilities.
 • How data is gathered, shared and used. 
 • The benefits of rationing time spent online.
9.6 In the government response to the above consultation, we also set out that we intend 
to produce supporting information for schools on how to teach about all aspects of internet 
safety, not just those relating to relationships, sex and health, to help schools deliver this in a 
coordinated and coherent way across their curriculum.
9.7 Schools will be encouraged to teach the new subjects from September 2019 – many of 
them are already doing this and will be able to adapt to the new guidance quite quickly. The 
requirement to teach the new subjects will then follow from September 2020.
76 BCS (2018). Young people want more from social media giants over online safety. Available at: https://www.bcs.org/
more/about-us/press-office/press-releases/young-people-want-more-from-social-media-giants-over-online-safety-
survey-by-bcs-reveals/ 
77 Department for Education (2019). Consultation outcome – Relationships (and sex) education and health education. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/relationships-and-sex-education-and-health-education
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9.8 The new computing curriculum, introduced in September 2014, includes the principles of 
e-safety at all key stages, with progression in the content to reflect the different and escalating 
risks that young people face. This includes how to use technology safely, responsibly, 
respectfully and securely, how to keep personal information private, and where to go for help 
and support when they have concerns about content or contact on the internet or other 
online technologies.
9.9 These changes to the curriculum are part of a broader strategy to ensure that schools 
are supporting young people to stay safe online. Some of the measures included in this 
strategy include:
 • A National Centre for Computing Education that will develop, curate and 
disseminate a central repository of free, high quality, knowledge-rich resources for 
teachers to cover the whole computing national curriculum (from key stages 1-4).
 • Strengthened statutory safeguarding guidance for schools in England, Keeping 
Children Safe in Education (KCSIE), including guidance on how to keep children 
safe online. The revised guidance came into effect on 3 September 2018.
 • A new online safety working group, established by the Minister for Children and 
Families and made up of online safety and education experts, to advise the 
department on future iterations of the safeguarding guidance.
Wider initiatives to empower users to stay safe online
9.10 In Chapter 2, we set out the significant body of work being led by the UK Council for 
Internet Safety to ensure that children and vulnerable adults are taught about online safety, 
and that parents have access to appropriate advice, including an online resilience toolkit 
and driving the adoption of the Education for a Connected World framework78 in schools 
(see Box 35). The government has also funded the UK Safer Internet Centre to develop 
cyberbullying guidance which provides advice for schools on understanding, preventing and 
responding to cyberbullying, and an online safety toolkit to help schools deliver sessions 
through PSHE about cyberbullying, peer pressure and sexting. There are a number of civil 
society organisations that have also made valuable contributions to online safety education 
and awareness, such as 5Rights (see Box 36). 
9.11 The Information Commissioner’s Office has also developed a public facing campaign 
to enable the public to better understand their data protection rights called ‘Your Data 
Matters’.79 The ICO has also produced teaching materials to support and empower children to 
understand their data rights.80
78 UKCIS (2018). Education for a Connected World framework. Available at:https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
education-for-a-connected-world
79 ICO. Your data matters – building confidence and trust. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/resources-
and-support/your-data-matters-campaign/ 
80 ICO. Resources for schools. Tailored lesson plans for children and young people. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/education/resources-for-schools/ 
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Online safety initiatives: Education for a Connected World Box 35
The UK Council for Internet Safety’s (UKCIS) Education for a Connected World framework 
describes the digital knowledge and skills that children and young people should have the 
opportunity to develop at different ages and stages of their lives. 
Designed to help educators engage in a meaningful dialogue with their students about 
their lives online, the tool covers a wide range of issues, including self-image and identity, 
privacy and security, online relationships and online bullying.
Online safety initiatives: 5Rights Box 36
The 5Rights Foundation is a registered charity that produces child-led and co-designed 
policies and works towards an online environment that meets the needs and protects the 
rights of children and young people online. 
The 5Rights framework takes existing children’s rights and applies them to the 
digital world: 
 • The Right to Remove.
 • The Right to Know.
 • The Right to Safety and Support. 
 • The Right to Informed and Conscious Use. 
 • The Right to Digital Literacy. 
Their report Disrupted Childhood: The Cost of Persuasive Design (July 2018) highlights 
how persuasive design strategies deployed to maximise the collection of personal 
data impact on children’s social, mental and physical development, and calls for better 
protections for children and young people. 
The 5Rights report Towards an Internet Safety Strategy (January 2019) sets out a 
framework to prevent harm to children from digital products and services. It sets out 
seven priorities for the development of online safety strategies: parity of protection, 
design standards, accountability, enforcement, leadership, education, and evidence-
based interventions. 
The need for greater online media and digital literacy 
9.12 Online media and digital literacy can equip users with the skills they need to spot 
dangers online, critically appraise information and take steps to keep themselves and others 
safe online. It can also have wider benefits, including for the functioning of democracy by 
giving users a better understanding of online content and enabling them to distinguish 
between facts and opinions online. In recent months, there have been several reports that 
recognise the importance of online media and digital literacy, calling for action at all levels. 
Box 37 summarises the recommendations of some of these reports.  
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Stakeholder calls for action to improve media and digital literacy Box 37
 • The House of Commons DCMS Select Committee has called for digital literacy to 
be the fourth pillar of education, alongside reading, writing and maths in its report 
Disinformation and ‘Fake News’. The Committee also noted the role of Ofcom, the 
ICO, the Electoral Commission and the Advertising Standards Authority in promoting 
digital literacy, and recommended that the government ensures that the four main 
regulators produce a more united strategy in relation to digital literacy.
 • The Cairncross review, A sustainable future for journalism, published in February 
2019,81 recommended that the government should develop a media literacy strategy, 
working with Ofcom (which has a statutory duty to promote media literacy), the 
online platforms, news publishers and broadcasters, voluntary organisations and 
academics, to identify gaps in provision and opportunities for more collaborative 
working. 
 • In 2018, the House of Lords Select Committee on Political Polling and Digital Media 
stressed the need to teach critical literacy skills in schools to limit the spread of 
misinformation online and its potential impact on democratic debate. 
 • The Children’s Commissioner’s report Growing up Digital, published in 2017, called 
for the creation of a compulsory digital citizenship programme for pupils aged 4 to 14, 
to improve children’s digital literacy skills and digital resilience and to broaden digital 
literacy education beyond safety messages.82
9.13 There has been significant work in this area, with several organisations in tech, media 
and civil society developing resources for use in school and at home, to equip children and 
young people with the skills to critically assess information and keep themselves safe online.
Online safety initiatives: Examples of news literacy initiatives for children  Box 38 
and young people
NewsWise is a free, cross-curricular news literacy project for 9-11 year olds across 
the UK. 
 • The project, a partnership between the Guardian Foundation, National Literacy Trust 
and the PSHE Association, officially launched in September 2018 and Google is 
funding its first year. 
 • The project aims to strengthen children’s critical thinking skills before they start using 
social media, and aims to deepen children and young people’s understanding of why 
and how the news is produced, with sessions on selecting facts, checking sources 
and news analysis to develop children’s skills of informed questioning and verification. 
81 The Cairncross Review (2019). A sustainable future for journalism. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/779882/021919_DCMS_Cairncross_Review_.pdf
82 Children’s Commissioner (2017). Growing up Digital: A report of the Growing Up Digital Taskforce. Available at: 
https://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Growing-Up-Digital-Taskforce-Report-
January-2017_0.pdf 
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The BBC’s ‘Young Reporter’ project works with young people aged 11-18 in schools, 
colleges and youth organisations to help them navigate news and current affairs and give 
them the skills to produce their own reports and share story ideas about what matters 
to them. 
Through the project, all schools have been given access to free online materials including 
classroom activities, video tutorials and the BBC iReporter game. This interactive game 
uses the principles of journalism to guide critical thinking by putting the player in the heart 
of the newsroom on the day of a breaking news story.
9.14 While we welcome these initiatives, we believe that there are notable gaps in provision 
and that adults need support too – for themselves but also as parents. Ofcom’s Children 
and parents: Media use and attitudes report 2018 (January 2019)83 notes that parents and 
carers are increasingly worried about the internet, and are finding controlling screen time 
harder. Fifty per cent of parents are concerned about the data companies are collecting on 
children and young people’s online activities. They also worry about children damaging their 
reputations, the pressures of children to spend money and the possibility of children being 
radicalised online. 
9.15 Government is committed to continuing to support parents in preventing and dealing 
with online harms. Government welcomes the support provided by the UK Safer Internet 
Centre. They produce a free Safer Internet Day resource pack for parents and carers, most 
recently in February 2019, helping parents and carers understand the facts about online risks 
and have positive conversations with their children about staying safe online. 
9.16 However, for adults, there is insufficient messaging or resources covering online 
media literacy. There is a need for further work to address issues such as the sharing of 
disinformation, catfishing (i.e. luring someone into a relationship by means of a fictional online 
persona), attacks on women online (particularly public figures), and the differing needs of 
people with disabilities when navigating information. We also recognise the need for improved 
coordination of activity. Ofcom is working with a number of partners to assess existing 
research and evidence about people’s attitudes and understanding of being online. This will 
assist policy-makers to identify gaps and opportunities. 
Online safety apps: NewsGuard Box 39
NewsGuard was first launched in the US in March 2018 by journalists to tackle the 
problem of disinformation online and is now available to UK users. 
 • NewsGuard rates and reviews news and information websites using nine standards 
of credibility and transparency, allocating a ‘nutrition label’ review which provides 
information on the site’s ownership, financing, content, credibility, transparency 
and history. 
 • The NewsGuard desktop browser extension displays these ‘nutrition labels’ next 
to headlines in social media feeds and search results. This has been rolled out in 
libraries in the US, and Microsoft now offers the extension as an optional setting in 
the desktop and mobile versions of its Edge browser.
83 Ofcom (2018). Children and parents: Media use and attitudes report 2018. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0024/134907/Children-and-Parents-Media-Use-and-Attitudes-2018.pdf
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An online media literacy strategy 
9.17 Industry and government have a shared responsibility to empower users to manage 
their online safety. The new regulator will have oversight of industry activity and spend, and a 
responsibility to promote online media literacy. 
9.18 Ahead of the new regulator, the government will develop an online media literacy 
strategy. The media literacy field is a broad one, and we will therefore consult widely, possibly 
through a new taskforce, in order to ensure its objectives are well informed by evidence and 
take account of existing work. 
9.19 The first step will be a comprehensive mapping exercise to identify what actions are 
already underway, and to determine the objectives of an online media literacy strategy. This 
process will involve convening representatives from tech companies, regulators, libraries, civil 
society, academics and government to identify ways to strengthen existing provisions, as 
well as to identify what additional activity is needed to make progress against key objectives, 
which may include: 
 • Ensuring that users can be more resilient in dealing with mis- and disinformation, 
including in relation to democratic processes and representation. 
 • Equipping people to recognise and deal with a range of deceptive and malicious 
behaviours online, including catfishing, grooming and extremism. 
 • Ensuring people with disabilities are not excluded from digital literacy education 
and support. 
 • Developing media literacy approaches to tackling violence against women and 
girls online. 
9.20 The strategy will also reflect the government’s commitment to look at how to give the 
public confidence in online information so they are equipped to make their own decisions 
about the issues that matter. The government has already invested over £1 million in 2018/19 
to deliver two initiatives in support of this:
 • The new ‘RESIST’ counter-disinformation toolkit equips government, public service 
and partner country communicators with the knowledge and skills they need 
to identify, assess and respond to disinformation. It will help develop a strategic 
and consistent counter-disinformation capability, and help reduce the impact of 
disinformation campaigns on UK society and our national interests, in line with our 
democratic values.
 • Government has launched a pilot public disinformation communications 
campaign.84 This campaign provides the public with the skills they need to 
recognise and respond to disinformation, showing people how it can affect them 
and what they can do about it. 
The role of the tech sector in empowering users
9.21 As set out above, we recognise that companies fund a range of valuable education and 
awareness activities. However, we believe there needs to be greater transparency about the 
level of investment, that all activity needs to be evaluated to ensure resources are directed at 
the most impactful initiatives, and that there should be greater coordination across industry to 
avoid duplication. 
84 https://sharechecklist.gov.uk/
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9.22 The new regulator will have the power to require companies to report on their 
education and awareness raising activity. We are consulting on appropriate powers for the 
regulator in this area. 
Consultation questions 
Question 17: Should the government be doing more to help people manage their own and 
their children’s online safety and, if so, what?
Question 18: What, if any, role should the regulator have in relation to education and 
awareness activity?
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Part 5: Conclusion and next steps
10: Conclusion and next steps
10.1 This White Paper sets out the UK’s ambitious vision for online safety, including a new 
regulatory framework to tackle a broad range of harms; the development of a safety by design 
framework and support for innovation in safety technologies; and a new online media literacy 
strategy.
10.2 The measures outlined in this White Paper are novel and ambitious, with potentially far 
reaching effects for how our society engages with the internet. The UK remains committed 
to a multi-stakeholder model of internet governance as the best way to ensure a free, open 
and secure internet. All stakeholders from industry, civil society and government have a 
responsibility to help address legitimate online harms. 
10.3 Given this, we want to engage with the widest possible audience on our proposals, 
and in particular invite views from industry, civil society, think tanks, campaigners and 
representatives. A series of consultation questions are posed throughout this document and 
they act as a basis for a formal consultation. We encourage respondents to provide not just 
their opinions, but also the supporting facts and reasoning to inform the evidence base for the 
development of our final proposals. 
10.4 The consultation begins on 8 April 2019 and will close 12 weeks after it opens on 1 
July 2019. We will then publish the government’s response to this consultation on the GOV.UK 
website, summarising the responses received and setting out the action we will take, or have 
taken, in respect of them in developing our final proposals for legislation. Further information 
on responding to this consultation can be found in annex A.
10.5 DCMS and the Home Office will also run a series of engagement workshops to 
convene civil society actors and user groups. This will focus in particular on groups which are 
disproportionately affected by online harm and abuse. Given the formal and technical nature 
of the consultation, this will allow us to facilitate engagement with a wider audience.
10.6 Alongside this, we will continue to draw on advice from legal, regulatory, technical, 
online safety and law enforcement experts, to inform the further development of these 
proposals. 
10.7 Finally, we are committed to continuing to build the evidence base for our proposals 
and will continue to work across government and with other stakeholders, including UKCIS, to 
commission a suitable programme of research. 
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Legislation
10.8 Following the publication of the Government Response to the consultation, we will bring 
forward legislation when parliamentary time allows.
Note on territorial scope
10.9 Internet services and their regulation is a reserved issue, therefore we intend for our 
proposed framework to apply on a UK wide basis. While some of the harms in the scope of 
this White Paper relate to offences in Scots or Northern Ireland Law, and therefore involve 
devolved competencies (such as child protection), we are not seeking to change the law 
in relation to these offences but rather to clarify the responsibility of companies to tackle 
this activity on their services. Education policy is devolved in Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. 
10.10 As part of the wider process of consultation, we will engage with the Devolved 
Administrations on the proposals in this White Paper. This consultation will consider in 
particular the implications for law enforcement, and explore how we can advance a cohesive 
UK-wide approach to educating children and adults about online safety.
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Annex A: How to respond to the 
consultation 
We are inviting individuals and organisations to provide their views by responding to the 
questions set out throughout this White Paper. The questions are listed below. 
The consultation will be open for 12 weeks, from 8 April 2019 to 23:59 1 July 2019. 
You can respond online via the following link:  
https://dcms.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_5nm7sPoxilSoTg9 
If you prefer, you can also email your response to: 
onlineharmsconsultation@culture.gov.uk
Or you can write to us at:
Online Harms Team
DCMS 
100 Parliament Street
London
SW1A 2BQ
Consultation Questions: 
Question 1: This government has committed to annual transparency reporting. Beyond the 
measures set out in this White Paper, should the government do more to build a culture of 
transparency, trust and accountability across industry and, if so, what?
Question 2: Should designated bodies be able to bring ‘super complaints’ to the regulator in 
specific and clearly evidenced circumstances? 
Question 2a: If your answer to question 2 is ‘yes’, in what circumstances should 
this happen? 
Question 3: What, if any, other measures should the government consider for users who wish 
to raise concerns about specific pieces of harmful content or activity, and/or breaches of the 
duty of care? 
Question 4: What role should Parliament play in scrutinising the work of the regulator, 
including the development of codes of practice? 
Question 5: Are proposals for the online platforms and services in scope of the regulatory 
framework a suitable basis for an effective and proportionate approach?
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Question 6 In developing a definition for private communications, what criteria should be 
considered?
Question 7: Which channels or forums that can be considered private should be in scope of 
the regulatory framework?
Question 7a: What specific requirements might be appropriate to apply to private 
channels and forums in order to tackle online harms?
Question 8: What further steps could be taken to ensure the regulator will act in a targeted 
and proportionate manner?
Question 9: What, if any, advice or support could the regulator provide to businesses, 
particularly start-ups and SMEs, comply with the regulatory framework?
Question 10: Should an online harms regulator be: (i) a new public body, or (ii) an existing 
public body? 
Question 10a: If your answer to question 10 is (ii), which body or bodies should it be?
Question 11: A new or existing regulator is intended to be cost neutral: on what basis should 
any funding contributions from industry be determined? 
Question 12: Should the regulator be empowered to i) disrupt business activities, or ii) 
undertake ISP blocking, or iii) implement a regime for senior management liability? What, if 
any, further powers should be available to the regulator?
Question 13: Should the regulator have the power to require a company based outside 
the UK and EEA to appoint a nominated representative in the UK or EEA in certain 
circumstances?
Question 14: In addition to judicial review should there be a statutory mechanism for 
companies to appeal against a decision of the regulator, as exists in relation to Ofcom under 
sections 192-196 of the Communications Act 2003? 
Question 14a: If your answer to question 14 is ‘yes’, in what circumstances should 
companies be able to use this statutory mechanism?
Question 14b: If your answer to question 14 is ‘yes’, should the appeal be decided on 
the basis of the principles that would be applied on an application for judicial review 
or on the merits of the case?
Question 15: What are the greatest opportunities and barriers for (i) innovation and (ii) 
adoption of safety technologies by UK organisations, and what role should government play in 
addressing these? 
Question 16: What, if any, are the most significant areas in which organisations need practical 
guidance to build products that are safe by design?
Question 17: Should the government be doing more to help people manage their own and 
their children’s online safety and, if so, what?
Question 18: What, if any, role should the regulator have in relation to education and 
awareness activity?
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